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        ABSTRACT 
Invasive species have caused significant environmental and economic damage in the 
United States. Depending on the biology of the invasive species, magnitude of economic 
damage, and cost of eradication or control, it may be optimal to eliminate (locally 
extirpate) an invasive species or to limit the population to levels that reduce the economic 
damage from what it would have been without control. This thesis examines the role that 
economic incentives might play in controlling an invasive species; specifically, a fishing 
derby that awards prize money to individuals who remove (harvest) the most lionfish 
(Pterois volitans), an invasive species now widespread in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean 
Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The thesis presents a bioeconomic model to simulate the lion- 
fish population when a derby is held if the estimated lionfish population exceeds a 
management threshold and when optimal prize money is awarded. The model is 
calibrated to derbies that have been held off Key Largo, Florida. Lionfish derbies require 
participants to register as members of a team. The team may then use spears or nets to 
harvest lionfish from coral reefs in a specified (derby-competition) area. Greater prize 
money will make the derby more ex- pensive to conduct but, in theory, should attract 
more teams and increase the aggregate level of harvest by those teams that participate but 
do not win prize money. The data in this thesis come from two sources: (1) biological 
research on the ex-ante and ex-post lionfish density in the derby (competition) area, and 
(2) the aggregate harvest and prize money awarded to the teams achieving the greatest 
harvested biomass. Simulation and optimization results indicate that derbies can 
significantly reduce lionfish biomass in a derby area when the population level that 
triggers a derby is above the steady-state lionfish population if the derby were held every 
year. However, when the population level that triggers a derby is below the steady-state 
population when derbies are held every year, lionfish biomass will increase back toward 
an environmental carrying capacity (the maximum population with no harvest). Optimal 
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prize money, economic damage done by lionfish, and the steady-state lionfish 
populations are all highly sensitive to carrying capacity. An increase in carrying capacity 
increases optimal prize money, steady-state lionfish population, and economic damage. 
Optimal prize money and the economic damage from lionfish are less sensitive to the rate 
of discount. An increase in the damage parameter, reflecting the marginal damage from 
lionfish, causes an increase in the optimal prize money and lionfish damage, but reduces 
the optimal steady-state biomass. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is now acknowledged that non-indigenous species not only cause environ-
mental damage, they also lead to great economic losses. In the Pimentel (2005)
study of alien-invasive species0 environmental and economic costs in the United
States, annual losses of $120 million resulted from non-indigenous species, and
this is a low estimate. In the past it was assumed that only disturbed habi-
tats and communities were likely to be affected; however, conservation stud-
ies show that even species-rich habitats can be threatened by non-indigenous
species.
There is no general framework of all invasive species in the United States;
instead there are various reports on the specific effects of particular species in
specific sites. There are also reviews of particular kinds of invasions-by aquatic
weeds, agricultural pets, etc. (Simberloff et al., 1997). Management tools are
designed for a particular species in a particular area with the understanding
that targeting species population dynamics and their interactions with local en-
vironments are key factors for management success (Pasko et al., 2014).
1.1 Incentive Programs
Incentive programs—such as bounty programs, contract operations, commer-
cial markets and recreational harvests-are gaining public awareness as means
to control or eradicate invasive species. Incentive programs help control the
density of invasive species while simultaneously developing a local economy.
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Susan Pasko and Jason Goldberg (2014) summarize the biological, ecological,
human health, socioeconomic, and other factors involved in successful incentive
programs. However, they do not point out whether these incentive programs
are effective in their long-term impacts on invasive species. Sustained species
monitoring, data recording, and specific program research are all needed for
future incentive programs and invasive species management.
1.2 Why Lionfish in Key Largo, Florida
Several features of the state of Florida make it an easy place for species invasion.
The peninsula has many new habitats and not many native species that might
be easily disturbed by humans. South Florida also has large tropical areas with
warm temperatures that allowmany species to survive. Studies show that abun-
dant lakes, streams, and other wetland habitats provide great opportunity for
aquatic non-native plants and animals to be introduced. Other factors, such as
modification of the state’s waterways for irrigation, water supplies, flood con-
trol, and extensive recreation, has promoted the further spread of non-native
species. Approximately 7,800 lakes comprise 6% of Florida’s area and 1,700
rivers dissect the state. Last but not least, Florida is a transportation hub and a
center of tourism from other regions of the country and the world. Miami is the
entry port for most visitors from Latin America and has numerous flights from
other regions: 85% of plant shipments pass through Miami and there were 333
million plants in 1990 (Simberloff et al., 1997).
The lionfish is one of most invasive species of fish in Florida. One effort to
curb its impact is the lionfish derby, which has been held in Key Largo since
2
2010 with the support of a non-profit organization, Reef Environmental Edu-
cation Foundation (REEF). There is sufficient data for studying this derby: the
organizers recorded the numbers and sizes of harvested fish, participant num-
bers, and prize monies awarded. Also, ecological estimation work of lionfish
in Florida has been done and that contributes to the construction of the bioeco-
nomic model in this analysis.
1.3 Objectives
This paper constructs a bioeconomic model that combines lionfish population
dynamics with derby harvests to assess the effects of derbies in controlling in-
vasive species and how to optimize prize money and determine total costs for a
sustainable level of lionfish biomass.
The lionfish population dynamic follows a logistic net growth function and a
harvest function and adopts a simple catch-per-unit-effort production function
that simplifies participants’ fishing efforts as a total number of participating
teams.
There are three main questions I seek to answer are these:
(1) Does a derby-designated lionfish threshold [x⇤, p⇤] have control effects
on lionfish biomass?
(2) How can invasive-species managers make decisions in choosing appro-
priately designated lionfish biomass x⇤ and awarding prizes p⇤?
(3) How are optimal prize money, total costs, and sustained lionfish biomass
3
levels affected by a change in each bioeconomic parameter?
It is hoped that the model constructed in this paper will be taken as a ref-
erence for REEF’s future lionfish control management as it monitors lionfish,
records data, analyzes derby, andmakes plans. It is also hoped that managers of
other invasive species, and related institutions and governments, can take cues
here for constructing their own incentive programs to control invasive species.
1.4 Organization
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on major methods of invasive species manage-
ment: the four major types of incentive programs and factors to be considered
in designing management programs. In addition, some examples of invasive
species incentive programs that use tournaments are listed. At the end, some
related lionfish derby research is introduced.
Chapter 3 reviews how this thesis’s dynamic optimization program is con-
structed. It first introduces the logistic net growth function of lionfish. Then it
adopts the catch-per-unit effort function of the harvest and simplifies lionfish
derby participants’ fishing behaviors by grouping them into a number of par-
ticipating teams of four people each. This can be done because all the fishermen
in the derby share a similar fishing environment and use similar equipment.
Chapter 4 carefully introduces the lionfish situation in Florida. It describes
the derby form, and it introduces research related to data andmodel parameters
in Florida.
Chapter 5 conducts an econometric analysis of lionfish and produces sensi-
4
tivity analysis of some key parameters, such as environmental carrying capacity
(K), discount rate ( ) and environmental damage coefficient (d).
Chapter 6 offers conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are approximately 50,000 foreign plant and animal species in the U.S. to-
day and environmental damages caused by some of these species amounts to
almost $120 million per year. Incentivizing and encouraging public or commer-
cial harvest can be effective tools in controlling invasive species while helping
to protect natural resource, develop the economy, and simultaneously awaken
environmental awareness. Invasive-species managers need to consider biolog-
ical, ecological, human health, and socioeconomic factors to design successful
management plans that also anticipate unexpected negative effects, such as the
broader spread of invasive species or wasted resources (Pasko et al., 2014).
There has been several invasive species control programs using tournaments,
including the Burmese Python Challenge in the Everglades, Asian Carp con-
tests along the Illinois River, and Lionfish Derby throughout Florida.
2.1 Invasive Species
2.1.1 Major Invasive Species
Some non-indigenous species have caused great environmental damage and
economic losses in agriculture, forestry, and several other segments of the U.S.
economy. According to David Pimentel, Rodolfo Zuniga and Doug Morrison
(2005), environmental damages and losses add up to almost $120 billion per
year, there are 50,000 foreign species in U.S., and approximately 42% of native
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species are threatened or endangered species are at risk because of competition
with or predation by alien-invasive species (Pimentel et al., 2005).
The $120 billion in damages per year is a low estimate. The reason for this
is that data on invasive species damage or indirect effects, are not readily avail-
able. Pimentel suggests that invasive species costs will definitely rise several
times higher than $120 billion per year if we include in our estimate species ex-
tinctions and losses in biodiversity, ecosystem services, and aesthetics (Pimentel
et al., 2005).
Most invasive fish have been established in mild climates area such as
Florida’s, where there are an estimated 50 species (Courtenay, 1997). Although
sport fishing contributes $69 billion to the U.S. economy (Bjergo et al., 1995; U.S.
Bureau of the Census (USBC), 2001), a conservative estimate of the economic
losses of non-native fish is $5.4 billion annually from more than 40 alien inva-
sive species (Pimentel et al. 2005).
Pimentel suggests adopting various strategies simultaneously to prevent
further damage to ecosystem and environment. For example, public education,
sanitation, and effective prevention programs at airports, seaports, and other
ports of entry can help reduce the possibilities of biological invaders entering
into the United States (Pimentel. et al, 2005).
2.1.2 Major Management Factors
A successful invasive species management plan needs to consider various fac-
tors and to find themost viable and appropriate approach. Several major factors
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need to be evaluated.
Biological Factors
Invasive-species managers need to consider the biological characteristics of tar-
geted species. First, a targeted invasive species’ population dynamics need to
be fully considered: it is necessary for calculating threshold invasive-species
density or required invasive-species reduction in the population (Pasko et al.,
2014). An Asian carp commercial harvest, for example, can help explain the im-
portance of population dynamics: Harvest efforts focus on large carp since this
size is most desirable for food markets. While this may benefit the ecosystem
by reducing average fish size, it decreases the likelihood of effective popula-
tion control because it ignores most of the smaller juveniles (Garvey et al, 2012;
Tsehaye et al, 2013).
Second, lack of consideration of the biological characteristics of targeted
species, such as demographic structure and density-dependent processes, may
lead to further side effects, called biological overconsumption. In the 2002-2003
Australian Victorian Fox Bounty Trial, approximately 20% of Victoria’s red fox
population was removed by hunters for pay. This trail actually simulated fox
population growth: since more resources were available for the surviving 80%,
the trail had effectively culled the population, producing a counterproductive
effect on population removal (Faithfull et al., 2005).
Third, reinvasionmay occur if invasive species dispersal and occupied range
is too widespread to eradicate them. For example, in Great Britain nutria
was effectively eradicated, but it has been difficult to replicate that success
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in the United States where the nutria population is much greater and more
widespread (Louisiana department of wildlife and fisheries (LWF), 2012a).
Last but not least, estimating a population’s size is necessary for any incen-
tive program to check whether program goals have been achieved; this can be
challenging because invasive species’ physical characteristics and living habi-
tats make them hard to detect (Pasko et al., 2014).
Ecological Factors
In addition to the biological consideration of invasive species themselves, their
impacts on ecosystems are another important factor in designing and imple-
menting an incentive management plan. Removal of one invasive species pro-
vide resources for other species to survive. For example, removal of wild pigs
(Sus scrofa Linnaeus, 1758) and sheep (Ovis aries Linnaeus, 1758) in Hawaii in-
creased the opportunity for flammable invasive grasses to grow in the state’s
lowlands, which increases frequency of fires (Pasko et al., 2014). Invasive-
species managers need to carefully evaluate interactions among native, and
non-native species in their environment before implementing any inventive
program.
Human Health Factors
Another necessary step in designing an incentive program is to evaluate a tar-
geted species’ impacts on human health, either when consuming them for food
or handling them during capture. During lionfish tournaments in Florida, par-
ticipating divers are required to use spears and nets for catching. However, the
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lionfish’s venomous spines can cause pain and swelling and even tachycardia,
seizures and temporary paralysis of humans when handled them improperly
(Morris et al., 2009). For those invasive species that are harvested for food, a full
health assessment is necessary (Pasko et al., 2014).
Socioeconomic Factors
Socioeconomic considerations such as costs, profits and risks are important fac-
tors for any incentive program. Invasive species always lead to losses in the
ecosystem and the economy and species managers need to evaluate the finan-
cial costs and risks of either eradication programs or long-term sustained control
operations (Pasko et al., 2014).
Long-term ecosystem and economic losses help to determine the overall goal
of a program. Bomford and O’Brien (1995) found that the nutria eradication
program in Great Britain was successful because the value of agricultural and
environmental resources protected was greater than the costs of program: Each
captured animal was worth more than $600, totaling more than $3 million.
In the process of creating an incentive program, determining factors include
harvested commodities’ value, harvest costs, harvesters’ minimum acceptable
profit, and the value of protected resources. A bioeconomic model integrates
those factors can help determine the effectiveness of incentives in controlling
targeted species population. A bioeconomic analysis of Louisiana’s Coastwide
Nutria Control Program (CNCP) concluded that increasing incentives help har-
vest more numbers of nutria, and that CNCP is an effective method of control-
ling Louisiana’s nutria population (Dedah et al, 2010). However, an incentive
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program may have unintended outcomes. One is that some people will even
raise non-native species and release them to profit from bounty programs or
commercial market (Pasko et al., 2014).
Government Intervention
Government intervention can play an important role in any incentive programs.
For a targeted invasive species with little commercial value, such as small size
Asian Carp, governments may provide seed funds to encourage consumers
and private industry to participate in eradication programs. Governments
formulate the appropriate administrative and legislative rules that guarantee
that incentive programs will proceed effectively. In 2013, Florida’s Fish and
Wildlife Commission waived catching licenses, determined the types of accept-
able catching gear types and eliminated catch limits on lionfish to make access-
ing them more convenient (Pasko et al., 2014).
Outreach
Incentive programs also contribute to raising public awareness of targeted in-
vasive species’ threats and actions. In Florida, Reef Environmental Education
Foundation (REEF) provides educational seminars before each annual lionfish
derby and prepares lionfish dishes for participants and tourists to sample (Mor-
ris, 2012; Pasko et al., 2014).
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2.1.3 Incentive Management Methods
There are four major incentive programs defined in Pasko and Goldberg (2014)
in their article that encourage harvest of invasive species.
Bounty Program
Bounty Program. An alternative to the popular derby is the bounty program,
in which a predetermined amount of money is paid to an individual upon sat-
isfactory evidence of collection of a specified organism (Pasko et al., 2014).
In January 2002, Louisiana established the Coastwide Nutria Control Pro-
gram (CNCP) for registered participants with an economic incentive payment
of $4 per nutria tail. Cheikhna Dedah and Richard Kazmierczak developed a
bioeconomic supply model that helps explain nutria harvests’ relations with a
suite of economic and environmental factors (Dedah et al., 2010). This article
suggested that nutria harvest is both related to the price paid for each animal
and environmental factors. It also suggests that the price should be increased to
$5 instead of $4 to achieve the goal of harvesting 400,000 nutrias per year.
CNCP’s 2015-2016 report shows obvious effects of CNCP in the years from
2002 to 2016. As shown in Figure 2.1, the nutria harvest has stabilized after
several years of CNCP, and there is an obvious effect that damaged herbivory
has decreased as observed in a series of surveys.
Table 2.1 presents the number of nutria harvested per year and herbivory
damage. The average nutria harvest in coastal Louisiana has reached 337, 947 +
/   60, 119 standard deviation per year. Total harvest of nutria over the past 14
12
Figure 2.1: Nutria Harvest and Coastwide Nutria Herbivory Damage
(Source: Coastwide Nutria Control Program 2002 to 2016)
Nutria
Harvested
Herbivory
Damage
(acres)
1999-2000 20,110 2000 97,271
2000-2001 29,544 2001 83,021
2001-2002 24,683 2002 79,444
2002-2003 308,160 2003 82,080
2003-2004 332,396 2004 63,398
2004-2005 297,535 2005 53,475
2005-2006 168,843 2006 55,755
2006-2007 375,683 2007 34,665
2007-2008 308,212 2008 23,141
2008-2009 334,038 2009 20,333
2009-2010 445,963 2010 8,475
2010-2011 338,512 2011 6,296
2011-2012 354,354 2012 4,233
2012-2013 388,160 2013 4,624
2013-2014 388,264 2014 4,181
2014-2015 341,708 2015 6,008
2015-2016 349,235 2016 6,496
Table 2.1: Nutria Harvest and Herbivory Damage from 1999 to 2016
(Source: Coastwide Nutria Control Program 2002 to 2016)
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seasons has reached 4,731,263 (CNCP, 2015 2016)
Contract Operation
Contract Operation. Similar to a bounty but based on a fixed number, a contract
operation provides direct payment to the public or service provider to remove
or harvest a species (Pasko et al., 2014).
One example of using a contract operation to control an invasive species
is the capture of Rhesus Monkeys in Florida. Trappers with state permission
can catch targeted animals and sell them to specified institutions or to the gov-
ernment. Over the past decade, a trapper named Scott Cheslak, has captured
approximately 700 of the juveniles or yearlings monkeys from the wild. He
continues to trap those monkeys and sells some of them to a research facility
according to USDA rules (Gillespie, 2013).
However, there have been voices within animal protection foundations that
have argued that the Rhesus Monkey should be protected for its natural beauty.
The animals are also prized for their contribution to a positive test for herpes B
virus, a virus that can be fatal to humans (Pittman, 2013).
Commercial Market
Commercial Market. This is an effort that is undertaken, usually privately,
when a perceived market exists for a species that can be harvested and offered
for sale (Pasko et al., 2014).
Commercial marketing has become one of the most important strategies to
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reduce the population of invasive carp, particularly black carp (Mylopharyn-
godon piceus) and bighead carp (Hypophthalmichthys nobilis), and also silver carp
(H. molitrix) in the Mississippi River Basin (Asian Carp Regional Coordinat-
ing Committee (ACRCC), 2012). It includes attempts to develop Asian Carp
products. For example, the Baton Rouge, Louisiana-based Silverfin Marketing
Group, created by Chef Philippe Parola, tried to create Asian Carp food for the
domestic and international markets. In Asian markets including China and Ko-
rea, there is great demand for cheap Asian Carp. Two Rivers Fisheries, based in
Wickliffe, Kentucky, shipped out 264,000 tons of Asian Carp (beheaded, dressed
and frozen) in 2014. Two Rivers bought between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of Asian
Carp daily from fishermen in Kentucky and Missouri. In 2015, the state of Ken-
tucky subsidized the rate paid to commercial fishermen at a price of at least 15
cents per pound for the fish. Before 2015, some processors have paid between 8
and 10 cents per pound (Downs, 2016).
Recreational Harvest
Recreational harvest actions enhance or encourage recreational fishing, hunting,
or trapping of invasive species by conducting outreach, modifying seasons, or
changing license requirements or bag limits (Pasko et al., 2014). The tourna-
ment is one of the major management tools of recreational harvest. Examples of
invasive-species tournaments are listed in next section.
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2.2 Tournament as a Management Tool
2.2.1 Python
In 2013 the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission held a month-
long Burmese Python (Python molurus bivittatus) catching tournament with cash
prizes. Because the tall grasses of the Florida Everglades make it difficult to spot
and catch pythons, only 68 snakes were caught out of an estimated population
of approximately 30,000 to 100,000 total population (Hoag, 2014)
The difficulty of capturing the cryptic Burmese Python in the Florida Ever-
glades means that much more monitoring efforts are needed, and perhaps in-
creased incentives, while also attending to the safety of snake hunters working
in that wild environment (Pasko et al., 2014).
2.2.2 Asian carp
In August 2016, I visited Bath, Illinois, and joined in the Redneck Fishing tour-
nament, a two-day event held every year. On each of the two days there are two
heats, one starting at 12 pm and the other at 4 pm. The entry fee is $60 per boat
per heat (unless prepaid before the event for $50). Participants are allowed to
use only dip nets to catch Asian carp as the fish jump out of the river.
Four cash prizes are awarded each day (regardless of the heat) for the great-
est number of fish caught. According to Betty Deford, organizer of the Redneck
Fishing Tournament, the size of the prize depends on how many boats regis-
ter that day. At the end of the day all of the caught fish are donated to a local
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fertilizer factory.
The competition takes place on a seven-mile stretch of the Illinois River with
Bath at the center. Even though there is an inland lake behind this stretch of
river, competition is allowed only in this shallow and narrow seven-mile stretch.
More Asian carp jump out of the water here due to the shallowness.
2016 was the 11th annual Asian carp tournament in Bath. Most of the par-
ticipants came from nearby cities and had participated at least once before; but
there were also participants from as far away as New York. (YouTube videos of
the unlikely sight of flying fish being caught in mid-air helped to popularize it.)
On the first day, approximately 2,800 fish were caught by fishermen registered
in 21 boats and $300 was awarded to the first prize boat. The record number
of fish caught in the two-day tournament was 10,631 in 2013. According to De-
ford, it cost between $6,000 and $7,000 to stage the event. In addition to fishing,
participants could eat and listen to live band music. A kind of Asian carp soup
was provided to introduce participants to Asian carp dishes.
In 2016 there were a total of 3,690 carp caught by 77 registered boats. Al-
though this was the 11th time the Redneck Asian carp fishing tournament had
been held, many organizers and members of the public did not realize that this
was more than a recreational weekend stunt: that it was also an effective way
to control an invasive species. There was a noticeable lack of information about
this at the tournament.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: Redneck Asian Carp Tournament in Bath, Illinois
2.2.3 Lionfish
The Reef Environment Education Foundation (REEF) has organized a lionfish
derby each year since 2010. Participants are allowed to use only spears and nets
to catch lionfish on coral reefs in competition areas. Derby organizers measure
each fish’s length and award prizes for the most fish caught, biggest fish caught,
and smallest fish.
Before and after the derbies in Key Largo and the Bahamas in 2012 and 2013,
Dr. Stephanie Green counted lionfish at 60 sites: Lionfish density declined more
than 60% over a 100–150 km2 area after competition. Although lionfish recolo-
nized the sites within six months, their size was much smaller and this reduced
the pressure on the reefs (Hoag, 2014).
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2.3 Bioeconomic Model
There are three main studies of lionfish derbies in Florida that analyze the im-
pacts and effectiveness of the events in controlling invasive species. The first
research, by Dr. Green, constructs an ecological model based on the assump-
tion that the lionfish preys on native species. Lionfish threshold density occurs
when the net rate of native prey biomass is zero, meaning that lionfish consume
all the available prey. This model is only ecological, it has no socioeconomic
factors. Green found that reductions in lionfish density of 25% to 92% were
required, depending on the fishing site. (Hoag, 2014).
The second research, also by Dr. Green, is a study of lionfish derbies: Volun-
teers culled lionfish during annual derby events from 2012 to 2014 in Bahamas
and Florida and it was found that they reduced lionfish densities by 52% over
192 km2 on average each year. In her analyses of derbies, Dr. Green and her re-
search team calculated the total area fished during each derby (total habitat over
which the teams fished during each tournament), and REEF recorded the num-
ber and size of fish collected lionfish. She found that derby participants helped
to reduce an average of 57% lionfish densities within the derby-designated ar-
eas. Lionfish size increased over time on Florida habitats that total invader
biomass rebounded to pre-culled levels after each derby. Dr. Green summa-
rizes three potential reasons for lionfish recolonization rates: (1) Lionfish popu-
lation in Key Largo, Florida is in a stage in their trajectory of population quick
increase. (2) High-complexity coral patch reefs and artificial structures provide
lionfish food and rest resources. (3) Movement of adult lionfish from adjacent
habitats has important impacts in colonization (Green et al., Unpublished).
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The third research, conducted by Cruz, Chaves, and Cote (2014), suggests
that management of invasive species can be facilitated by public participation.
Information was collected on 69 lionfish derbies held in the wider Caribbean
region from 2010 to 2015. These researchers found that derbies attended mainly
by artisanal fishers reported lower catches but more participation than derbies
attended by recreational divers or a mixed public. Participation was best pre-
dicted by national wealth (GDP per capita) and the number of local dive shops.
All of the research to date has tried to evaluate various aspects of the
problem, mainly from either an ecological or a socioeconomic point of view.
There is no research that combines these two factors to generate a bioeconomic
model that will simultaneously predict human behavior and lionfish population
thresholds. The model presented here merges ecological and economic factors.
A dynamic optimization model can help to solve this problem. In a book on
resource economics (Conrad, 2010) it is stated that there are two key features of
the dynamic optimization problem: 1) state equation in a dynamic optimization
system helps to restate natural resource evolution over time; and 2) decision in
time period t will affect the level of state variable in the next period t + 1. With
an objective function that usually maximizes or minimizes some net economic
values and subjects to relevant constraints, solution to a natural resource opti-
mization problem will be a ‘time path,’ indicating optimal resource extraction
in each period, or a ‘policy’ indicating how resource stock can affect harvest.
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CHAPTER 3
BIOECONOMICMODEL
We consider the making of a dynamic optimization model in two parts: objec-
tive function and constrained conditions. Our objective function is to minimize
the discounted value of the sum of each period’s environmental costs and derby
prize money. The constrained conditions of the annual derby illustrate that li-
onfish populations grow again between successive years and the decision of
whether a derby should be held is decided by the amount of prize money that
can be raised and by lionfish density. The model is a standard bioeconomic
dynamic optimization model as described by Colin W. Clark (2010).
3.1 Logistic Net Growth Function
To describe a lionfish derby in mathematical terms, it is first necessary to make
clear the lionfish net growth pattern.
A basic renewable-resource exploitation model describes the lionfish growth
pattern. This model is sometimes used in fisheries (Clark, 2010 ):
dx
dt
=G(x)   h(t), t > 0 (3.1)
x(0) =x0 (3.2)
where x = x(t) denotes lionfish biomass at time t (x0 means initial lionfish stock
at time t = 0).
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The general production model G(x) in equation (3.1) represents the net
natural-growth rate of the lionfish population biomass that depends on its cur-
rent biomass. Here lies an assumption that the production model G(x) does not
involve lionfish population structure, such as the age of individuals or spatial
distribution (Clark, 2010). The natural growth function G(x), e.g. General Pro-
duction Function, satisfies the following three assumptions:
G(x) > 0 f or 0 < x < K (3.3)
G(0) = G(K) = 0 (3.4)
G00(x) < 0 f or 0 < x < K (3.5)
where K is the environmental carrying capacity for the given population.
Equation (3.3) tells us that the production function G(x) which depends on
current lionfish biomass is always greater than zero if the lionfish biomass is
between none and carrying capacity. Equation (3.4) tells us that lionfish produc-
tion is none when there are no lionfish (e.g. x = 0) or lionfish biomass reaches
the upper limit of environmental constraints (e.g. x = K). x = 0 is an unstable
equilibrium since dxdt > 0 for small x > 0 (when h = 0). It means that population
will necessarily recover over time if harvesting ceases. Eradicating the last num-
ber of population is really hard to achieve in reality. x = K is a stable equilibrium
for a population not beging harvested. The reason is that the case x > K never
happens under natural conditions (Clark, 2010). Equation (3.5) tells us that the
rate of marginal production is negative, which means that marginal production
decreases when stock size increases. In Figure 3.1, the upper figure presents the
general production function where the bottom figure presents the marginal pro-
duction function. In addition, several obvious assumptions needs to be made
22
Figure 3.1: Production Function and Marginal Production Function
clear: (1) the lionfish derby in Key Largo involves a single species in an unstruc-
tured population; (2) it has constant parameters; (3) it is deterministic; and (4)it
has no seasonal variation (Clark, 2010)
Ecologists refer to dxdt = G(x), x(0) = x0 as a harvest-free resource model under
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Figure 3.2: Logistic Net Growth Function with Time
density dependence (May, 1981; Walters et al., 2004).
With assumptions (3.3) to (3.5), the following functional form for G(x) is
called the logistic net growth model:
G(x) = rx(1   x
K
) (3.6)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population. When x = x0 << K,
the population is growing in an approximately exponential way; it eventually
approaches but never reaches or crosses the carrying capacity over time. Figure
3.2 shows the population growth pattern of production function (Clark, 2010).
We then turn back to Figure 3.1, where the marginal production function
is positive when the stock size is small, but continues decreasing over different
stock sizes and becomes lower than zero gradually. What happens to the general
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production function is that the biomass is increasing at a decreasing rate when
marginal production is greater than zero. Then the general production function
reaches its highest level at the stock size where marginal production is zero.
Finally, the general production function begins to decrease in an increasing rate
after marginal production across the stock size is zero and continues decreasing.
The local maximum stock size where marginal production reaches zero is
also called Maximum Sustained Yield, which means the largest harvest rate that
can be sustained indefinitely (Clark, 2010). By using equation (3.6), we get:
G(xMSY) = rxMSY(1   xMSYK )
G0(xMSY) = r(1   2xMSYK ) = 0
xMSY =
K
2
3.2 Harvest Function
In equation (3.1) h(t) represents the rate of removal, or harvest, of lionfish
biomass at time t (Clark, 2010). We can incorporate human behavior, such as
lionfish derby participation, and predict the outcome under various conditions.
Here we adopt the Scheafer catch-effort harvest function:
h = qEx (3.7)
E(t) is a function of time t and represents the harvesting effort at time t. Har-
vesting effort means the number of (standard) vessels actively fishing at time t.
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Figure 3.3: Feedback Harvest Policy
The units would then be Standard Vessel Units (SVU). q > 0 is a constant called
the catchability coefficient: it represents howmuch of the current biomass xt can
be exploited by one standard vessel in one time unit (Clark, 2010). The Scheafer
catch effort harvest function is a special case of the Cobb Douglas production
function Ht = qx↵t E
 
t where ↵ =   = 1. It is called the catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE)
production function (Conrad, 2010).
Equation (3.10) is also called feedback harvest policies that express harvest as
a function of stock size. Since q is a constant and E is fishing effort with no
relation to stock size x, the feedback harvest policies function is a line through
the origin. The intersection of G(x) and h(t) is called steady-state equilibrium
such that the production of fish stock equals harvest rate. We can observe it
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from equation (3.1).
dx
dt
= xt+1   xt = G(x)   h(t), t > 0
When
G(x)   h(t) = 0, G(x) = h(t) = Yss
dx
dt
= xt+1   xt = 0, xt+1 = xt = Xss
In the steady state, each period’s fish stock and harvest rate always keep to the
constant levels of Xss and Yss, and they are sustainable ad infinitum (Conrad,
2010).
3.2.1 Functional Form of Fishing Effort Et
The next problem is how to measure the fishing effort of a lionfish derby in
Key Largo, Florida. In the next chapter I will describe in detail how the lionfish
derby proceeds. A few key features of the derby describe the fishing effort’s
functional form:
(1) All participants are divided into teams and each team has a maximum of
four people.
(2) The lionfish derby in Key Largo is held on a single day each year, typically
from sunrise to sundown in the summer.
(3) Participants are allowed to use only spears and hand-held nets, not fish-
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Figure 3.4: Fishing Effort Team Number Relation
ing poles or mechanized nets; they typically dive down to the coral reef to catch
lionfish in the competition area; and teams are required to return to the record-
ing station at the end of the day to calculate their lionfish biomass.
(4) The competition area is a 50-mile range near where the recording center
is set up on shore: a known lionfish habitat.
These four facts help simplify the fishing effort function. Participants’ fish-
ing efforts do not need to be measured individually; they can be measured by
teams instead. Because all of the teams have identical fishing time, fishing en-
vironment, and fishing equipment, each team’s fishing effort is the same in one
standard vessel unit. Total fishing effort can then be measured by the number
of teams that actively fished during the hours of the derby.
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We define Nt as the number of four-person teams, then
Et = aNt (3.8)
is a level of effort in a derby, where a is assumed to be greater than 0; as more
teams participate in this derby, there will be more total fishing effort.
3.2.2 Team Numbers Nt Explained by Derby Prizes
The number of participating teams is regarded as a function of prize money
offered
Nt = p
 
t (3.9)
where   is the congestion parameter, and 0 <   < 1. Figure 3.5 helps explain
where congestion comes from: the large rectangle represents the 50-mile area
near shore where the lionfish derby is held; the triangles represents the coral
reef where lionfish rest; and the stars represents teams of fishermen. The teams
anchor their boats near the reefs and members dive into the water to catch li-
onfish. Coral is not distributed uniformly in the derby-designated area, and
several teams may surround the same cluster of coral.
Three assumptions are needed for the four-person teams-prize relation func-
tion.
(1) As prize money goes up, more participants are attracted to the derby and
the number of participating teams goes up.
(2) 0 <   < 1.The number of teams increases at a decreasing rate with in-
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Figure 3.5: Lionfish Derby Area Example
Figure 3.6: Four-Person Team Number and Prize Relation
30
creasing prize money. Let’s make an extreme guess: when award prize is ex-
tremely large, an increase of one dollar or any small unit of change in prize
money will not attract another unit of participating teams. Participants will
think the change is too small to generate more interest in the derby. Thus, the
number of four-person teams increases as a strictly concave function of prize
money which is shown in Figure 3.6.
(3) Although ecologists may argue that there will be fun-seeking participants
even without the offer of prize money, economists are interested in the impact
of prize money; so functional form is simplified around the concept of team
numbers, not individuals.
3.2.3 Transformed Harvest Function
Now, the harvest function can then be transformed to this:
Ht = qEtxt = qaNtxt = qa(p
 
t )xt = mp
 
t xt (3.10)
where m = qa > 0 is the coefficient of harvest function; 0 <   < 1 is congestion
parameter; pt is award prize at time t; and xt is lionfish biomass at time t.
3.3 Incentive Sector: Pt
The incentive of a tournament, such as a derby, is different from a bounty pro-
gram. A bounty awards participants money for each unit of a species hunted
while a tournament is a contest that awards prize money to only the most suc-
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cessful hunters. From the point of view of an invasive-species manager, it may
be advantageous to pay derby winners an amount of money to help reduce in-
vasive species biomass—without having to pay the less successful hunters, too.
In the lionfish derby in Key Largo, prize money is awarded to three groups:
(1) The team that collects most number of lionfish.
(2) The team that finds the biggest lionfish.
(3) The team that finds the smallest lionfish.
It may be argued that prize money should be awarded to the team that lands
the greatest number of lionfish, and prizes for biggest and smallest fish make no
economic sense in using a derby to reduce invasive species biomass. However,
if a team catches a great number of lionfish, there is a higher probability of
catching a variety of lionfish of bigger and smaller sizes. Thus, prizes for lion-
fish sizes can trigger participants’ interests in catching more fish. For example,
2016 Key Largo lionfish derby information collected from REEF shows that the
winning team, called Rob’s Angels, caught the most number of lionfish, a total
of 113. This team was also awarded the biggest prize for the largest lionfish:
they caught a 41.4 cm lionfish among their 113 fish. This same team, Rob’s An-
gels, was awarded the prize for the smallest lionfish, a 9 cm specimen. Thus,
catching more lionfish will increase the probability of catching the biggest and
smallest lionfish of the day. So awarding prizes for the biggest and smallest lion-
fish will drive participants to catch more fish. For my estimation and analysis, I
summarize the three prizes and treat them as one big prize at each time t.
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3.4 Environmental Damage is a Function of Invasive Species
Density
The environmental damage caused by lionfish can be evaluated using a travel
cost model or contingent valuation method. However, there is not enough in-
formation to construct these two models. We have little direct information, and
even less data, on lionfish damage. An alternative method to determine an up-
per bounds for lionfish environmental damages is to list all invasive species in
a targeted study area. The Appendix lists all invasive species in Key Largo. In-
formation on these invasive species is not sufficient for an estimation. Conrad
(2010) makes two assumptions for lionfish environmental damage function:
Assuming that k(xt) is damage in year twhen lionfish biomass in year t, then
(1) Larger pollution stocks (lionfish) will result in higher damage k0(xt) > 0.
(2) Damage might be ’smoothly’ increasing at an increasing rate k00(xt) > 0
Assumptions (1) and (2), imply that the damage function is strictly convex
to lionfish biomass. Thus, the lionfish environmental damage function can be
written as equation (3.11) that is strictly convex.
kt =
d
2
x2t , d > 0 (3.11)
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Figure 3.7: Lionfish Environmental Damages
3.5 Dynamic Optimization Model Equation
I can then construct the dynamic optimization model. The objective function
means that the invasive-species managers’ goal is to minimize the sum of each
period’s value of environmental costs plus derby prize money. Ct = kt + pt is
total costs of lionfish at time t.
Min
[x⇤,p⇤]
C =
TX
t=0
⇢t[k(xt) + pt] (3.12)
subject to
xt+1   xt = G(xt)   h(pt, xt), given x0 > 0 (3.13)
I f xt > x⇤, pt = p⇤ (3.14)
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I f xt < x⇤, pt = 0 (3.15)
It is important to clarify what our model will solve in the end. Two un-
knowns, x⇤ and p⇤, that are the key variables for growth patterns and harvest-
ing strategies. Invasive-species managers are goal oriented. They establish har-
vest levels by setting prize monies and appropriate biomass density to trigger a
derby. To be more specific, invasive-species managers designate a certain level
of biomass density x⇤ before holding a tournament. When biomass exceeds this
level, the manager will hold a tournament and set prizes p⇤ accordingly. If the
invasive species has not recovered, then a tournament is not held and nobody
receives an award. The threshold [x⇤, p⇤] and other factors work together to
reach equilibrium. By choosing appropriate x⇤ and p⇤, invasive-species man-
agers wish to reach the goal of minimizing present total costs, subject to three
constraints. First, the change of invasive-species biomass between year t+1 and
year t is the invasive species’ natural growth minus harvest in year t, given that
the initial invasive-species biomass in the competition area is also greater than
0. Second, if invasive species density in year t is the same or greater than thresh-
old x⇤, then this means that the invasive-species manager should hold a fishing
tournament and set the prize money p⇤ at the appropriate level to help control
fish density in the competition area. Third, if invasive species density in year t
is less than threshold x⇤, then density has not reached the level to hold a fishing
tournament. Organizers should not hold a fishing event at this time, thus the
award prize is 0.
We assume that natural growth function is:
G(xt) = r(1   xtK )xt (3.16)
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where r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the environmental carrying capacity.
The environmental cost function is in a quadratic format:
k(xt) =
d
2
x2t (3.17)
where d > 0 is the estimation of damage coefficient.
The harvest function:
h(pt, xt) = mp
 
t xt (3.18)
m > 0 is the coefficient of harvest function. 0 <   < 1 is congestion parameter; pt
is award prize in year t; and xt is lionfish biomass at time t.
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CHAPTER 4
LIONFISH
Like many other invasive species, lionfish invade a new area along a theoretical
trajectory that has four patterns: lag phase, exponential growth, invasion peak,
and equilibrium (Figure 4.1). As Morris (2012) points out in report, invasive
species population peak can exceed the carrying capacity of the new system.
After a lionfish population crosses the invasion peak (which is always beyond
the carrying capacity), other factors drive a lionfish population to equilibrium,
including competition with native species or for food and space, predation (in-
cluding cannibalism), parasitism and disease, and abiotic factors such as water
temperature (Morris, 2012).
The lionfish is one of the most serious threats to coral reefs. Not only does
the fish destroy the reef’s food web, it can also have an impact on commercial
fisheries, tourism, and overall health of a reef, which leads to great economic
losses (Morris, 2012).
4.1 Biologcal and Ecological Features of Lionfish
4.1.1 Biological Characteristics
Genetic analysis suggests that nearly a dozen lionfish were originally released
in the waters off the Florida coast. These were mainly two species of lionfish:
devil firefish (Pterois miles) and red lionfish (P. volitans) (Hammer et al., 2007;
Freshwater et al., 2009; Hoag, 2014).
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Figure 4.1: Lionfsih Predictable Trajectory (Source: Morris, 2012)
Lionfish are general carnivores preying on a wide variety of fish and crus-
taceans (Morris et al., 2009; Cote et al., 2013). DNA analysis of 157 lionfish
stomachs from fish that were caught in the Mexican Caribbean found that these
lionfish had consumed 43 crustacean and 34 fish species, including parrotfish,
French grunt and graysby that are an important food for local people (Hoag,
2014).
The spines of the lionfish, except for the caudal spines, contain apocrine-type
venom glands. As Halstead (1955) indicate, each spine is encased in an integu-
mentary sheath or skin and contains two grooves of glandular epithelium that
comprises the venom producing tissue. Lionfish envenomation happens when
a spine enters the victim and its integumentary sheath is depressed (Morris,
2012). Because of this powerful weapon, lionfish have been documented to con-
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sume prey more than 40% of their total length—which means that lionfish that
are more than 40 cm long can consume fishes and crustaceans up to 15 cm (Mor-
ris, 2012).
4.1.2 Geographic Range
Lionfish (Pterois volitans) first showed up on the eastern seaboard of the United
States in the 1980s, preying on coral reef fish. A lionfish was first sighted near
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 1985. The fish quickly spread more than 4 million
square kilometers throughout the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic
coastline. They are now found from North Carolina to Venezuela (Hoag, 2014),
but Figure 4.2 shows the status lionfish in 2015 that they are as far as north
as New York State. The lionfish invasion has occurred rapidly in a wide geo-
graphic range, so it seems likely that the invasion will continue to expand.
The lionfish habitat is unusually broad: The fish can live anywhere from
the surface of the sea to more than 300 meters deep. Usually they are found
near coral and hard bottoms, artificial reefs, mangroves, canals, seagrass beds,
ledges, sand holes, and rocky shorelines. They usually rest under ledges or in
sheltered bottom areas during midday hours; they are active in the low light of
dusk and dawn (Morris, 2012).
4.1.3 Reproduction
Male and female lionfish exhibit minor sexual dimorphism during spawning
time. The two genders are hard to distinguish visually (Fishelson, 1975). Gener-
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Figure 4.2: USGS: Lionfish Status in 2015
ally, males grow larger than females. The largest recorded male lionfish was 476
mm (Morris, Unpublished Data). (Note that 1 cm = 0.394 inches, lionfish that is
47.6 cm is 18.75 inches long). Fishelson (1975) reported that in courtship, male
and female lionfish circle each other, side-wind, follow, and lead one another.
This ritual begins before dark and continues into nighttime hours.
Lionfish can spawn two million eggs a year. They have few predators or
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competitors in the areas to which they are introduced. Based on collections
from North Carolina and the Bahamas, it is suggested that lionfish reproduce in
all seasons of the year, nearly every 34 days (Morris, 2009). The settlement age
of lionfish in the Atlantic is estimated to be approximately 20-35 days within a
mean of 26.2 days (Ahrenholz et al., 2012).
4.1.4 Ecological Effects
Lionfish prey on some herbivorous species that have great effort in cleaning
algae off coral reefs and compete food and space resource with economically
important species like snapper and grouper (Morris, 2012). Simulations by Jesus
Ernesto Arias-Gonzalez at the Center for Research and Advanced Studies of
the National Polytechnic Institute, in Merida, Mexico, have predicted that 10%
of coral biomass would be decreased from lionfish invasion within ten years
(Hoag, 2014).
An experiment by Alins and Hixon (2008) reported a 79% reduction in fish
recruitment on experimental patch reefs in the Bahamas for a five-week obser-
vation period. An average of a 65% decline in prey biomass have occurred in
the Bahamas over a two-year period (Green et al., 2012a). Lionfish consume
a series of species and sizes of native fish and invertebrates, including cryptic
and small-bodied species and the juvenile size classes of larger bodied species
(Green et al., 2012a). Research shows that lionfish grow much faster and con-
sume prey at much higher rates than native Coney grouper (Cephalopholis fulva),
leading scientists to be concerned that lionfishmay outcompete these native fish
in invaded reefs (Albins, 2012).
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Figure 4.3: Potential Lionfish Prey: Masked Goby (top-left), Secratery
Blenny (top-right), Nassau Grouper (bottom-left), Spanish
Hogfish (Source: Morris, 2012)
Besides the direct effect of causing native species to vanish, the lionfish will
also cause indirect effects on the entire marine food web if their invasion in-
fluences the benthic communities. One of indirect effects of lionfish can be its
predation depletes grazers’ population that control coral-algal dynamics (Mor-
ris, 2012).
4.1.5 Socioeconomics Effects
The socioeconomic impacts of the lionfish invasion haven’t been quantified yet,
but they can be observed in the fishing and tourism economies (Morris, 2012).
As indicated in Morris’s and Akins’s 2009 report, lionfish predation on econom-
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Figure 4.4: Potential Lionfish Competitors: Nassau Grouper (top-left),
Black Grouper (top-right), Coney Grouper (bottom-left),
Caribbean Spiny lobster (Source: Morris, 2012)
ically important species, such as juvenile serranids, could result in a decrease in
landings, hamper stock rebuilding efforts, and slow conservation-based initia-
tives (Morris et al., 2009). Since lionfish have venomous spines that will release a
toxin when they encounter divers, there is a risk of human harm and a potential
reduction in recreational activities. Fishermen, divers, beachgoers, and those
in the restaurant trade where lionfish are a food fish have higher than average
possibilities of encountering them.
For fishing economies, lionfish may affect the catch per unit effort (CPUE)
of fished species in two ways: (1) Lionfish predation and competition with na-
tive species may lead to decreases in the target species population size (2) The
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presence of lionfish may increase the cost of fishing for other species in terms
of time, effort, and safety risk. For example, lobster traps that are found with
lionfish in them require extra time and effort in handling (Morris, 2012).
For tourism economies, lionfish could have an impact in two ways: (1) The
invasion changes the ecosystem structure andmakes it less desirable and attrac-
tive. For example, a reduction in coral reefs fishes and coral reefs themselves
may affect dive tourism. (However, lionfish themselves are a popular sighting
species and could actually boost tourism if divers find it desirable to fish for
them. (2) In both cases there is increased risk to human health because of the
possibility of envenomation of tourists (Morris, 2012).
4.1.6 Current Situation
Lionfish population density is 5 to 15 times denser in the Western Hemisphere
than in the fish’s natural range. It can sometimes reach 400 fish per hectare at
sites off the coast of North Carolina and the Bahamas (Hoag, 2014). Across 17
locations off the coast of North Carolina in 2004 there was a reported average
of 21 invasive lionfish per hectare (Hamner et al., 2007). In 2008, the highest
lionfish densities reached was around 450 per hectare (off North Carolina) with
mean densities of 150 per hectare (Morris, 2009).
It seems that lionfish will continue to expand southward to South America
along the coastlines of the Caribbean until water temperature exceeds lionfish
tolerance (Morris, 2009).
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Figure 4.5: Potential Lionfish Future Distribution: Sea Surface Tempera-
ture is the Only Limiting Factor (Source: Morris, 2012)
4.2 Fishing Derbies and Dr.Stephanie Green’s Work
4.2.1 Lionfish Derby in Key Largo, Florida
As an invasive-species management method, the fishing derby can be success-
ful in managing lionfish densities and minimizing impacts on the local area.
However, while local removal efforts can be effective in reducing targeted in-
vasive species, time and geography are key to designing comprehensive con-
trol plans. The first step is identifying a priority area: a marine protected area
45
Figure 4.6: Various Gear Types and Pros & Cons (Source: Morris, 2012)
(MPA), high visitation or tourism spot, spawning aggregation areas, vulnera-
ble nursery sites, or other high priority areas (Morris, 2012). The presence of
divers or tourists who enjoy diving and snorkeling make it possible for lionfish
removal to become a part of the tourism trade and a boon to a local economy
(Morris, 2012).
In the Key Largo derby, lionfish hunting weapons are restricted to nets and
spears, thus standardizing the fishing efforts from one team to another. (The
use of hand-held nets is standard for divers whose primary means of hunting
is spear fishing.) Because the lionfish is sedentary while waiting patiently for
prey to cross its path, the most effective way to hunt lionfish is to stalk them
and pierce their skin with a spear fishing gun at close range (Morris, 2012).
Lionfish derbies in Florida often raise significant prize money through spon-
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(a) Small Mesh Bait Nets (b) Hawaiian Sling
Figure 4.7: Major Lionfish Fishing Tools (Source: Morris, 2012)
sorships and reward winners handsomely. With good reason: In 2009, the 18
teams in the lionfish derby in Abaco, Bahamas, helped to remove 1,408 lionfish
in a single day.
In addition to encouraging local tourism, the derbies help scientific institu-
tions to collect data. They also educate the public about the fish by, among other
things, offering lionfish tastings.
The main initiatives for managing lionfish derbies are nonprofit organiza-
tions, parkmanagers, fishermens’ unions, and research institutions (Cote, 2014).
According to REEF data, prize money remains at approximately $3,550 (in to-
tal) each year from 2010 to 2016, except in 2013 when the the prize was slightly
more, $3,625.
4.2.2 Dr. Stephanie Green’s Study
In a study of the ecological effects of invaders, Dr. Stephanie Green et al. (2014)
constructed an ecological model to find the threshold density of suppressing
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Figure 4.8: Lionfish Derby in the Green Turtle Cay, Abaco, Bahamas, 2009
(Source: Morris, 2012)
lionfish based on the hypothesis that the biomass of prey fishes left on a reef
will decline if lionfish consume prey at a rate that exceeds the rate of prey pro-
duction. The study then calculated two rates (prey consumption by invasive
lionfish and biomass production by native fish prey) for experimental reefs and
manipulated lionfish densities to observe changes of prey species biomass. The
targeted threshold for suppressing lionfish densities would be those reefs where
prey species biomass had minimal changes (Green et al., 2014).
Dr. Green’s study was conducted over 18 months on 24 natural coral patch
reefs in Rock Sound, off Eleuthera Island, Bahamas, between December 2009
and June 2011 (Green et al., 2014).
By experimentally adjusting lionfish densities for each reef to approach the
simulated threshold, and monitoring native fish populations, the researchers
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tested their predictions (Green et al., 2014). They finally predicted that for some
reefs it was necessary to remove 25-92% of lionfish to prevent the animals from
consuming too much prey. After the experiment, they found native species had
rebounded by 50-70% in the reef that reached targeted protection goal (Hoag,
2014; Green et al., 2014).
In a paper under peer review, Dr. Green describes in detail how the derbies
proceeded in Key Largo, Florida, between 2012 and 2014. Lionfish densities
were reduced by an average of 52% over the 192 km2 competition area in the
Bahamas and Florida. The research team’s before-and-after control impact field
surveys (BACI) helped to estimate initial lionfish densities in derby area; this is
an important data reference for this thesis.
The data for Dr. Green’s researchwas randomly selected from 60 survey sites
that ranged from less than a km from the central scoring station to more than
50km away. The 60 sites included a variety of near-shore marine habitats, such
as patch coral reefs, artificial structures, sea grass beds, and shoreline ledges at
depths of 5 to 15 ft. This assortment of habitats covered lionfish habitats that
were likely to be culled in a derby and those that were unlikely to be culled.
By conducting detailed research on each site one week prior to the derby and
one week after the derby, Dr. Green estimated the pre- and post-derby lionfish
densities from 2012 to 2014 (Green et al., Unpublished).
She found that derby participants helped to reduce an average of 57% li-
onfish densities within the derby-designated areas. Population suppression did
not appear to affect the areas adjacent to the derby areas. Lionfish size increased
over time on Florida habitats that total invader biomass rebounded to pre-culled
levels after each derby. Dr. Green summarizes three potential reasons for lion-
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fish recolonization rates: (1) Lionfish population in Key Largo, Florida is in a
stage in their trajectory of population quick increase. (2) High-complexity coral
patch reefs and artificial structures provide lionfish food and rest resources. (3)
Movement of adult lionfish from adjacent habitats has important impacts in col-
onization (Green et al., Unpublished).
4.3 Environmental Costs of Lionfish
The Reef Environmental Education Foundation (REEF) has been holding annual
lionfish fishing derbies in Key Largo since 2010. In 2013, a total of 22 teams with
a maximum of four members each caught 707 lionfish . This was the year that
$3,625 was awarded in prize money. Based on 50 completed surveys returned
from participants, the investigated group included people of all ages and an
even mix of local residents and out-of-towners. This survey also showed that
most of the participating lionfish hunters are high-income earners which may
indicate a willingness to participate in future derbies. Participants spent a total
of $24,561 for this single-day derby event (or approximately $280 per person).
Their main expenditures were boat fuel (16%), dive boat fees (14%), accommo-
dations, restaurant meals, and automobile transport (12% each), according to
Nardelli et al. (2014).
An alternative method to estimate the environmental costs caused by lion-
fish uses a travel cost model or contingent valuation method. However, since
there is not enough data to conduct these two econometric analyses, a list of
invasive species in south Florida can be helpful. There are more than 29 non-
indigenous species, according to the USGA website. A list is in Appendix.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
5.1 Data Collection
Lionfish derbies have been held in Key Largo, Florida, since 2010, and there
are seven derbies for which information has been recorded by organizers and
volunteers. Two main sources of data include: primary data from these seven
derbies between 2010 and 2016 as collected by derby participants and REEF
organizers; and secondary data from Dr. Stephanie Green at Oregon State Uni-
versity. We thank Dr. Green for her willingness to share her data.
REEF’s data includes: (1) the length of each lionfish caught in each of the
derbies, (2) the number of teams each year, (3) the prize monies awarded, and
(4) number of lionfish caught. Dr. Green’s data includes lionfish population
estimates for 60 randomly selected sites ranging from 1 km to 50 km from the
central scoring station, one week before and one week after each derby (both
percentage change and numbers for the derby area). These 60 sites covered a
variety of near-shore marine habitats, including: (1) patch coral reefs, (2) artifi-
cial structures, (3) sea grass beds, and (4) shoreline ledges at depths of 5 to 15
ft. Before and after comparisons allowed Dr. Green to estimate the reduction in
lionfish density attributable to each derby (Green et al., Unpublished).
The data covers only seven derbies and is therefore of limited use in the
calibration of certain bioeconomic parameters needed for our model. Thus we
calibrated some parameters from extrapolations of the biological literature on
lionfish and from plausible, subjective judgments. The data pertains only to
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Key Largo. Derbies are always affected by a variety of ecological and sociolog-
ical factors and each one exhibits different data. The lionfish derby data in this
analysis only represents one location’s use of the derby as an invasive-species
management tool.
Our analysis determines the optimal amount of prize money that should
be awarded for maximum effect in lionfish derbies in Key Largo. We conduct a
sensitivity analysis to determine how this amount is affected by a change in each
bioeconomic parameter. Scientists first spotted lionfish in Key Largo in 2009, the
first derby was held in 2010, and the most recent derby was in September 2016.
REEF’s data includes the length of every lionfish taken during seven years
of derbies. We use a known metabolic relationship that relates biomass of the
ith lionfish, Bi in grams, to length, Li in centimeters (Allen, 1971; Banse et al.,
1980; Jennings, 2015).
Bi = a1Lb1i (5.1)
where a1 = 0.00497 and b1 = 3.291 are length to mass scaling constants found
at fishbase.org. We can then calculate total harvest biomass for each year. To-
tal prize money each year was $3,550, with the exception of 2013 when it was
$3,625. For our analysis, it would have been helpful if the prize money had
varied (between $1,000 and $20,000 for example) to see if the size of the prize
influenced the number of participants and to determine the optimal prize. Ta-
ble 5.1 displays data on total catch, fish length, fish biomass, effort (number of
participating teams and prize money from 2010 to 2016). Note that taking 2010
as the base year, all award prizes are adjusted to be in 2010 dollars. Data on the
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fishing area and percentage of biomass reduction are reprinted in Table 5.2.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
5.2.1 Parameters
Some of our parameters come from the literature and from scientific websites;
whereas some other parameters are calibrated from assumptions.
Since there are few studies of lionfish ecology in the Gulf of Mexico or
Florida Keys, the carrying capacity K is unknown. I assume it is greater than
any lionfish densities measured before derbies:
K   xBt , t is f rom 2012 to 2014
The intrinsic growth rate of red lionfish in the southern Gulf of Mexico is r
= 0.88 ( Source: Fishbase.org). It is estimated from the von Bertalanffy growth
function (VBGF):
lt = l1(1   e K(t t0))
(Note that K is growth rate in this function, not carrying capacity.)
The construction of the harvest function employs the Cobb Douglas model
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Table 5.1: Lionfish Derby Summary Statistics from 2010 to 2016
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total
Catch (#)
532 675 461 707 573 488 323
Average
Length
(mm)
139.77
(25.464)
197.4
(44.090)
194.07
(66.785)
219.37
(68.141)
262.32
(61.87)
256.68
(66.864)
255.85
(68.528)
Min (mm) 50 70 43 42 51 24 48
Max
(mm)
270 373 410 426 435 433 414
Average
Biomass
(g)
32.92
(21.462)
109.04
(85.745)
127.63
(145.185)
177.23
(170.491)
280.07
(203.885)
270.13
(207.515)
270.58
(211.308)
Min (g) 0.992 3.003 0.604 0.559 1.059 0.089 0.868
Max (g) 255.255 739.350 1,009.318 1,144.836 1,226.379 1,207.920 1,042.088
Team
Numbers
(#)
21 16 9 22 15 14 9
Total
Prize
Award ($)
3,550 3,441.37 3,371.6 3,322.93 3,669.88 3,266.01 3,207.33
a Source: Reef Environmental Education Foundation.
b Standard deviations in parentheses
c 2010 as base year. Based on latest US Government CPI data, prize and cost
need to be adjusted for inflation effects
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Table 5.2: Lionfish Derby Summary Statistics from 2010 to 2016 (cont’d)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Area
Fished
(km2)
- - 218 207 194 - -
Percentage
density
reduction
( f ish ⇤
ha 1)
- - 59 74 23 - -
Percentage
biomass
reduction
(kg ⇤ ha 1)
- - 60 76 11 - -
a Source: Dr Green (Reviewing), Table 1.
with Ordinary Least Square estimation procedures. The general idea is to see
how changes in prize money affect total harvest of lionfish biomass in year t.
With this objective in mind, I perform three steps to calibrate unknown parame-
ters or estimate biomass, including congestion parameters and harvest function
coefficients. We perform different regressions on lionfish derby information and
on Dr. Green’s data.
Step one uses lionfish derby harvest information and Dr. Green’s study of
the percentage of lionfish reduction to calculate pre-derby lionfish biomass for
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years 2012, 2013, and 2014. The mathematical relation can be stated as:
Total Harvest Biomasst = Total Catcht ⇤ Average Biomasst
= % Biomass Reductiont ⇤ Pre   Derby Biomasst
Pre   Derby Biomasst = Total Catcht ⇤ Average Biomasst% Biomass Reductiont
Table 5.3: Reprint Lionfish Derby Summary Statistics from 2010 to 2016
Pre-derby
biomass: xt
(g)
Total
Harvest
Biomass:
ht (g)
Team
Numbers:
Nt (#)
Total Prize
Award: pt
($)
2010 - 17,515.65 21 3,550.00
2011 - 73,600.39 16 3,441.37
2012 98,059.00 58,835.40 9 3,371.60
2013 164,873.37 125,303.76 22 3,322.93
2014 1,458,910.09 160,480.11 15 3,269.88
2015 - 131,823.67 14 3,266.01
2016 - 87,396.77 9 3,207.33
a Source: Reef Environmental Education Foundation and Dr
Green (Reviewing), Table 1, p. 18
In step two, I use participants’ information and prize money to estimate con-
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gestion parameter  . The regression is:
Nt = p
 
t
lnNt =  lnpt
where Nt is the number of teams in year t and pt is the total award prize money
in year t.
In step three, I use derby harvest information, calculate pre-derby biomass
and the number of participating teams, and then estimate the coefficient of har-
vest function. Based on our assumption, the harvest function is:
ht = mNtxt
m =
ht
xtNt
t = 2012, 2013, 2014
where ht is total harvested biomass in year t. Nt is the number of partici-
pating teams in year t. xt is the calculated pre-derby biomass (g) in year t
(t = 2012, 2013, 2014).
The lionfish environmental cost function is density dependent, and I assume
that
D =
d
2
x2t
where d is the environmental damage coefficient. Since a travel cost model and
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contingent valuation method are not available here to do an estimation, I may
just make some assumptions for lionfish environmental damages and use it to
calculate damage coefficient d.
5.2.2 Threshold x⇤ and p⇤
The Excel solver can help to find an optimal solution but it locates only the local
minimum optimal solution, not the global optimal solution.
Instead, I use the x⇤   p⇤ table to identify the optimal combination. As we can
see in Table 5.3, the first row represents varied award prizes from $0 to $12,000
in $400 increments. The first column represents designed lionfish biomass from
500,000 to 1,900,000. Each cell is a calculated cost of different combinations.
These are then sorted for the minimum value for each threshold of lionfish
biomass in the last column. In other words, each row is an attempt to find
the minimum cost for a specific designed lionfish biomass threshold x⇤. After
locating each row’s minimum costs in the table, the corresponding award prize
p⇤ can be decided. The combination [x⇤, p⇤] is then the threshold with a specific
total cost. Table 5.4 is a frame of table method.
5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis measures the reaction of a model to small changes in pa-
rameters, whether these are identified in the literature or come from estimation
strategies. The more accurately they are defined, the more reliable the model
and its ability to forecast the evolution of the system under different conditions.
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Table 5.4: Table Method Finding Threshold [x⇤, p⇤]
x⇤
p⇤
0 $400 ..... $11,600 $12,000 Min TC
500,000 .....
600,000 .....
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....
1,800,000 .....
1,900,000 .....
The method is to change the parameters that are not estimated by economet-
ric techniques to conduct sensitivity analysis: carrying capacity, discount rate,
and environmental damage coefficient (Link et al., 2011; Dueri et al., 2012). To be
more explicit, the base case for carrying capacity is K = 2, 000, 000 g. By chang-
ing carrying capacity (K) by 10% every time and then calculating the threshold
award prize, we find that the total cost is the same for the designed threshold
of lionfish derby biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g. The same idea also applies to dis-
count rate ( ) and environmental damage coefficient (d), but it is not necessary
to change 10% each time.
By comparing percentage change of parameters with percentage change of
corresponding threshold prizes and total cost, I calculate the elasticity to show
optimal prizes and total cost responsiveness to those parameters.
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The responsiveness of award prize can be expressed as
 p⇤/p⇤
 K/K
and
 TC/TC
 K/K
(5.2)
Similarly, responsiveness of discount rate and environmental damage co-
efficient can then be:
 p⇤/p⇤
  / 
and
 TC/TC
  / 
(5.3)
 p⇤/p⇤
 d/d
and
 TC/TC
 d/d
(5.4)
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
In Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, I present the time series trend and histogram of lion-
fish derbies from 2010 to 2016. This reveals several significant characteristics of
our sample. The average length and biomass of lionfish caught by participants
increased from 2010 to 2014, when it reached a height of 262.73 mm and 280.07
g; it then decreased to approximately 255 mm and 270 g in years 2015 and 2016.
The increase in length and biomass from 2010 to 2014 suggested the possibility
that lionfish density was increasing. Figure 5.1 shows that standard deviation
in length grew rapidly before 2012, then grew flatter from 2012 to 2016. The
standard deviation for biomass increased at a decreasing rate from 2010 to 2016.
Although biomass has increased over the years, the decreasing rate and stable
standard deviation in length is a sign that the lionfish population in Key Largo
may have reached a relatively stable state.
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Figure 5.1: Length (mm), Biomass(g), Length Standard Deviation (mm)
and Biomass Standard Deviation (g)
Figure 5.2 reflects the distribution of lionfish sizes with a 95% confidence
interval for each derby. The average length was moving rightward and 95%
range dispersed at first and became more stable from 2012 to 2016.
There are various factors that affect lionfish biomass. The Key Largo derby
may be an important one in reducing and lionfish density to a relatively stable
level. Dr. Green’s study suggests that adult lionfish from adjacent habitats may
be the reason for the increased size over time (Green et al., Unpublished).
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Figure 5.2: Histogram Lionfish Derby
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5.3.2 Parametrization and Initial Guess
In order to calculate the threshold for lionfish densities and optimal prizemoney
for fishing tournaments, there are several parameters to be calibrated based on
our model and assumptions.
Intrinsic Growth Rate r
The intrinsic growth rate of lionfish was measured to be r = 0.88 in Alacranes
Reef, located in the southern Gulf of Mexico (Source: fishbase.org). This growth
rate is estimated from the von Bertalanffy growth function (VBGF):
lt = l1(1   e K(t t0))
(Note that K is growth rate in this function, not carrying capacity.)
Discount Rate   and Initial Stock x0
Let’s take discount rate   = 0.02 and initial lionfish biomass x0 = 100, 000 g.
Environmental Carrying Capacity K
Dr. Green measured the percentage of biomass reduction pre- and post- derby
from 2012 to 2014. This information provides clues to calculate local pre-derby
lionfish densities for three consecutive years. For example, an estimated 60%
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reduction in biomass in year 2012 within the 218 km2 derby area means that the
total harvest of lionfish in the 2012 derby was just equal to 60% of pre-derby
lionfish biomass. Similarly, pre-derby lionfish biomass can also be calculated
for the 2013 and 2014 derbies. Thus,
Total Harvest Biomasst = Total Catcht ⇤ Average Biomasst
= % Biomass Reductiont ⇤ Pre   Derby Biomasst
THB2012 = 0.6xB2012 = 58, 835.40 g, x
B
2012 = 98, 059.00 g
THB2013 = 0.76xB2013 = 125, 303.76 g, x
B
2013 = 160, 480.11 g
THB2014 = 0.11xB2014 = 159, 526.90 g, x
B
2014 = 1, 458, 910.09 g
As for the carrying capacity K in Key Largo, there are few studies of it. From
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, the harvested lionfish’s average length and biomass
reached their highest levels in 2014. By calculating three consecutive years’ pre-
derby lionfish biomass (2012 to 2014), I assume the carrying capacity is greater
than the highest pre-derby biomass densities and that K = 2, 000, 000 g.
Congestion Parameter  
A direct measure of congestion parameter   and harvest function coefficient m
is unavailable. However, a simple assumption can be made that the number of
participating teams is an exponential function of total prize money to conges-
tion parameter 0 <   < 1with the coefficient set to 1.
Although the prize money has been adjusted for inflation, the dataset is so
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Figure 5.3: Participating Team as a Function of Prizes
small that I get an initial guess of   by conducting Ordinary Least Square esti-
mation.
Table 5.5 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of prize money on partici-
pating teams. It shows that the congestion parameter   is 0.328 with p value less
than 0.05. The estimate in Table 5.5 is therefore consistent with the hypothesis.
Harvest Function Coefficient m
There are only three observations and the estimation result is an initial guess.
Table 5.6 shows OLS estimates of the product of participating teams and the
pre-derby biomass on total harvest of lionfish biomass. The coefficient m is
0.00816, but p value is greater than 0.05, which is insignificant. Since there are
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Table 5.5: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Derby Prize Money on Number of
Participating Teams. Dependent Variable: Log of Participating
Teams. Independent Variable: Log of Prizes, 2010 to 2016
Variable Coefficient
(Std.
Err.)
lnpt 0.328⇤⇤⇤ (0.016)
N 7
R2 0.985
Adj-R2 0.983
F (1,6) 396.194
*** p < 0.001.
Table 5.6: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Product of Participating Teams
and Pre-derby Lionfish Biomass on Total Harvest of Lionfish
Biomass. Dependent Variable: Participating Teams ⇥ Pre-derby
Biomass. Independent Variable: Total Harvest Biomass, 2012 to
2014
Variable Coefficient
(Std.
Err.)
Ntxt 0.00815 (0.004)
N 3
R2 0.729
Adj-R2 0.594
F (1,2) 5.39
p > 0.05
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Figure 5.4: Harvest Function
only three observations for conducting this OLS estimation, it is an initial guess
for sensitivity analysis.
Environmental Damage Coefficient d
Environmental costs are a big part of each derby’s total costs. Since there is
not enough information on the participants themselves, it is not possible to use
the contingent value method or travel costs model to estimate the environmen-
tal costs of the event. Instead, the environmental damages are assumed to be
$0.02/ha. Taking the average derby area to be 200 km2 and lionfish biomass
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to have a maximum carrying capacity such that xt = K = 2, 000, 000 g, then
xt = 10, 000 g/km2. Based on
D =
d
2
x2t
d =
2D
x2t
= 0.00000004
Notice that I made several assumptions for calculating parameters that
doesn’t reflect the real situation. However, I can vary values for d to see how
threshold x⇤ and p⇤ and optimization lionfish densities changes over time.
The initial guess for all parameters are listed in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Initial Guess
Parameter Meaning Value
Biological Parameters
r Intrinsic growth rate 0.88
K Carrying capacity 2,000,000
Economic Parameters
  Congestion parameter 0.328
  Discount rate 0.02
d Damage coefficient 0.00000004
m Harvest function coefficient 0.00815
Initial Conditions
x0 Initial value of lionfish population density at t=0 100,000
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5.3.3 Threshold x⇤ and p⇤
In our model, the threshold combination [x⇤, p⇤] can be understood to mean that
if lionfish density in Key Largo near the shore where the derby will be held
is greater than the invasive-species manager’s designed threshold x⇤ , then the
derby should be held and winners awarded p⇤ prize.
The threshold range for lionfish biomass and award prize is x⇤ from 100,000
g to 2,000,000 g and p⇤ is from 0 to $12,000. In Figure 5.5, we can see from
the 3D plot that total costs over the years increases when the threshold of li-
onfish biomass is increasing; and it is generally increasing when the threshold
derby prize is decreasing. However, it cannot be known directly from the figure
whether the total cost will increase or decrease as the prize money keeps going
up.
In Figure 5.6, different colored lines represent different prize levels p⇤. There
are two features of the increasing trend: (1) For p⇤ = 0, the highest blue line
has constant total costs of approximately $3.1 million. All other colored lines
represent the total cost for other prize money. They are all lower than the blue
line. This means that the total costs in a year that has a lionfish derby is always
lower than the total costs in a year in which the lionfish derby is not held. (2) For
each prize, the total cost increases when threshold biomass increases generally.
In Figure 5.7, different colored lines represent different thresholds of lionfish
biomass x⇤. The highest yellow line represents the threshold of biomass equal to
the environmental carrying capacity x⇤ = K = 2, 000, 000. In that situation, total
costs will be approximately $3.1 million. For other threshold biomass, total cost
is decreasing when the prize is increasing, and after reaching a level then the
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Figure 5.5: Total Costs with Different Combination of Threshold Lionfish
Biomass and award Prize [x⇤, p⇤]
total cost increases.
Returning to Figure 5.5, the exact optimal combination of x⇤ and p⇤ from the
graph may not be located directly; but there is an alternative way to do this. By
using the table method shown in Table 5.4, all optimal combinations are listed
in Table 5.10. Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 are excerpts of the table method that cal-
culates total costs for lionfish biomass from 500, 000g to 1, 900, 000g and award
prize p⇤ from 0 to $12, 000. Then it also helps to locate the approximate threshold
[x⇤, p⇤] combination that leads to minimum total costs for each different lionfish
biomass threshold x⇤ level. For example, in the first row of Table 5.8 and Table
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Figure 5.6: Total Costs with Different Thresholds of Lionfish Biomass x⇤
5.9, each cell calculates total costs of x⇤ = 500, 000 and p⇤ 2 [0, 400, ..... , 12000],
then the last column indicates that the minimum costs for x⇤ = 500, 000 is
$2,425,146.52. This is the value when p⇤ = 6, 800 (Underline Value). Thus,
[x⇤,p⇤]=[500000, 6800] is the optimal threshold combinationwithminimum costs
equal to $2,425,146.52. Similarly, all other optimal threshold combinations can
be located. Note that the table method helps to locate the approximate com-
bination of optimal threshold p⇤, we then need to use a spreedsheet and Excel
Solver to double check the p⇤ and find a more accurate p⇤ value for each x⇤ and
total costs.
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Table 5.10: Threshold Biomass and Prize Combination
x⇤ (g) p⇤ ($) Cmin ($) Periodic
Derbies
1st Derby
Start Year
Sustained Li-
onfish Biomass
Level (g)
500,000 $6,935.23 $2,425,106.05 No 4th 1,663,044.193
600,000 $7,050.54 $2,429,717.49 No 5th 1,661,216.819
700,000 $7,050.54 $2,429,717.49 No 5th 1,661,216.819
800,000 $7,050.54 $2,429,717.49 No 5th 1,661,216.819
900,000 $7,050.54 $2,429,717.49 No 5th 1,661,216.819
1,000,000 $7,141.35 $2,436,762.00 No 6th 1,659,791.722
1,100,000 $7,141.35 $2,436,762.00 No 6th 1,659,791.722
1,200,000 $7,141.35 $2,436,762.00 No 6th 1,659,791.722
1,300,000 $7,141.35 $2,436,762.00 No 6th 1,659,791.722
1,400,000 $7,199.62 $2,446,832.00 No 7th 1,658,883.7
1,500,000 $7,199.62 $2,446,832.00 No 7th 1,658,883.7
1,600,000 $7,199.62 $2,446,832.00 No 7th 1,658,883.7
1,700,000 $4,866.81 $2,460,062.42 No 7th 1,700,000.112
1,800,000 $1,413.78 $2,598,228.97 No 8th 1,800,000.003
1,900,000 $10,130.88 $2,711,309.00 Yes 8th 1,664,990.116
a The Reference Discount Rate   = 0.02.
b The Reference Carrying Capacity is K = 2, 000, 000.
c Sustained Lionfish Biomass Level for x⇤ = 1, 900, 000 is obtained in year with derby.
Table 5.10 presents the corresponding results for the threshold biomass from
500, 000 g to 1, 900, 000 g. The first column lists different lionfish biomasses in
increments of 100, 000 g. Using the table method, the corresponding thresh-
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old prize and minimum environmental costs are presented in columns two and
three. Column four indicates whether a derby is periodical: An entry of ‘No’
means the lionfish derby will be held every year while ‘Yes’ means that a derby
will be held every other year. Column five indicates the anniversary of the first
year of the derby. Column six is the final sustained lionfish biomass after the
derby has been held for several years.
Table 5.10 shows several interesting features. For each specific lionfish
biomass, there is a corresponding prize. Although some of the designated
biomass amounts have the same prizes with the same calculated minimum to-
tal cost, it can be observed from the table that in general the minimum total
costs increases when the designated threshold increases. However, p⇤ is not al-
ways increasing as x⇤ is increasing: When x⇤= 1,700,000 g, Cmin= $2,460,062.42 is
greater than the previous value, but p⇤= $4,866.81.73 is decreasing. When x⇤=
1,800,000 g, Cmin= $2,598,228.97 keeps on increasing, but p⇤= $1,413.73, which is
lower than all previous p⇤ levels. All lionfish levels will be held every year ex-
cept lionfish biomass threshold x⇤= 1,900,000 g. The very first year of the lionfish
derby is delayed generally when the threshold biomass is increasing.
The last column in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.8 shows all the different sustained
levels of lionfish biomass together. When a designated threshold is less than 1.7
million grams, the final sustained biomass with a derby will always be approx-
imately 1.66 million grams. When x⇤ = 1, 700, 000 g to 1, 800, 000 g (beyond
1.66 million grams), the sustained lionfish biomass will stay at the designated
threshold of biomass. When x⇤ = 1, 900, 000, the lionfish derby will be held ev-
ery other year and the sustained biomass in a year with a derby will remain at
approximately 1.66 million grams. Note that all final sustained lionfish biomass
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Figure 5.8: Sustained Lionfish Biomass Level with Lionfish Derby (t=0-15)
levels will be greater than x⇤ when x⇤  1, 600, 000 g.
Discussion
When derby managers review Table 5.10, they must choose the best x⇤ based on
their considerations, then they can use a solver to find a more accurate p⇤ that
minimizes the sum of lionfish damage and prize money. How can we explain
the above interesting features of Table 5.10? Some math functions can help us
understand them.
Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 help to illustrate how lionfish biomass, harvest rate,
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award prizes and costs change over time. Note that time period t is from 0 to
99, a total of 100 periods.
In Table 5.11, it shows the evolution of the path of lionfish biomass x⇤ 2
[10, 11, 12, 13]⇥105. It is interesting to observe that the threshold award prize
and minimum total costs are the same as each other. In order to explain this, we
need to review our dynamic optimization system: Since
G(xt) = r(1   xtK )xt
k(xt) =
d
2
x2t
h(pt, xt) = mp
 
t xt
Then the objective function can be rewritten as:
Min
[x⇤,p⇤]
C =
TX
t=0
⇢t[kt + pt] =
TX
t=0
⇢t[
d
2
x2t + pt] (5.5)
and constrained conditions then are:
xt+1   xt = Gt   ht (5.6)
= r(1   xt
K
)xt   mp t xt, given x0 > 0 (5.7)
xt+1 = (1 + r   rK xt   mp
 
t )xt (5.8)
I f xt > x⇤, pt = p⇤ (5.9)
I f xt < x⇤, pt = 0 (5.10)
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From Equation (5.8), two key variables, lionfish biomass in year t (xt) and
award prize in year t (pt), play an important role in determining the next pe-
riod’s lionfish biomass (xt+1). We can iterate beginning steps to see how xt and
pt are determined. The initial lionfish biomass in time t = 0 is x0 = 100, 000, then
based on Equation (5.5), Equation (5.8), Equation (5.9) and Equation (5.10),
x1 = (1 + r   rK x0   mp
 
0)x0
C0 = ⇢0[
d
2
x20 + p0]
that both x1 and C0 is a function of x0 and p0. In order to simplify the equation,
I just use
x1 = f0(x0, p0)
C0 = g0(x0, p0)
where f0 and g0 are all polynomial functions. Then
x2 = (1 + r   rK x1   mp
 
1)x1 = f1(x1, p1)
C1 = ⇢1[
d
2
x21 + p1] = g1(x1, p1)
replacing x1 in the functional form of x0 and p0, we get
x2 = f1(x1, p1) = f1( f0(x0, p0), p1) = F1(x0, p0, p1)
C1 = g1(x1, p1) = g1( f0(x0, p0), p1) = G1(x0, p0, p1)
where F1 and G1 are new polynomial functional forms. Similarly, different pe-
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riod values for lionfish biomass xt and cost Ct can be expressed in a function of
x0 and different award prize pt
x3 = F2(x0, p0, p1, p2), C2 = G2(x0, p0, p1, p2)
x4 = F3(x0, p0, p1, p2, p3), C3 = G3(x0, p0, p1, p2, p3)
..... .....
x99 = F98(x0, p0, p1, ....., p98), C98 = G98(x0, p0, p1, ....., p98)
and C99 = G99(x0, p0, p1, ....., p99)
In the end, the final total costs can be written as
C =
TX
t=0
Ct = C1 + ...... +C99 = G(x0, p0, p1, ....., p99)
where G is the final polynomial function.
Invasive-species managers are goal-oriented and they are trying to find the
minimum values for total costs and threshold award prize p⇤ that will drive
what they want. We then turn back to Table 5.11, subtable (a) (b) (c) (d) are
exactly same to each other except the threshold lionfish biomass x⇤ is different.
When x⇤ = 1, 000, 000, the iterative equation (5.8) can be used to calculate each
period’s lionfish biomass xt. Then, comparing it to designated lionfish biomass,
we can decide whether a derby should be held in time t based on constrained
conditions (5.9) and (5.10). Table 5.11(a) shows that pt = 0 when time t is from 0
to 4, which means a derby is not held in those times. In period t = 5, the lionfish
biomass x5 = 1, 370, 813, 25: this is the first time it is greater than the designated
x⇤ level and the first a derby is held with award prize p⇤.
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Then the total costs for lionfish threshold biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 is
C = G(x0, p0, p1, ....., p99) (5.11)
= G(x0, p5, p6, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 4] (5.12)
Invasive-species managers use the table method and Excel Solver to locate the
optimal threshold award prize p⇤ = $7, 141.35 when x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 and Equa-
tion (5.12) is minimized C = $2, 436, 762.00. After several years of holding a
lionfish derby with p⇤ = $7, 141.35, the lionfish biomass and award prize ap-
proach a steady state that
xt+1 = xt > x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
Based on Equation (5.9): If xt > x⇤, pt = p⇤, the award prize for each period is
always the same when time t is much greater than 0:
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
In Table 5.11 (a) (b) (c) (d), lionfish biomass in time t = 4 is x4 = 932, 800.21
and in time t = 5 is x5 = 1, 370, 813.25. Different lionfish biomass thresholds
are all in this range of x4 <x⇤ 2 [10, 11, 12, 13]⇥105 < x5 which means that
the first derby-hold time is the same for those biomass thresholds. Thus, for
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x⇤ 2 [11, 12, 13]⇥105, the total cost function is also
C = G(x0, p5, p6, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 4]
The table method tries different combinations and finds that p⇤ = $7, 141.35 and
C = $2, 436, 762.00 is also the optimal choice for those x⇤. After several years of
derbies, the lionfish biomass and harvest rate approach a steady state,
xt+1 = xt > x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
A similar process also applies to x⇤ 2 [6, 7, 8, 9]⇥105 where p⇤ = $7, 050.54 and
Cmin = $2, 429, 717.49, and x⇤ 2 [14, 15, 16, 17]⇥105 where p⇤ = $7, 199.62 and
Cmin = $2, 446, 832.00
When x⇤ 2 [6, 10, 14]⇥105, Table 5.12 (a)(b)(c) shows that p⇤ and Cmin are
increasing when x⇤ is increasing. The reason is that the first derby-hold time is
different and then the total cost function is different and it results in a different
threshold award prize p⇤ when using the table method.
C = G(x0, p4, p5, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 3], x⇤ = 600, 000
C = G(x0, p5, p6, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 4], x⇤ = 1, 000, 000
C = G(x0, p6, p7, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 5], x⇤ = 1, 400, 000
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However, all those lionfish biomass thresholds are lower than the sustained li-
onfish biomass after holding derbies for several years. Thus, for each threshold
biomass x⇤, lionfish biomass and harvest rate approach the steady state,
xt+1 = xt > x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
This raises another question: when reviewing Table 5.10, lionfish threshold
biomass x⇤ = 1, 600, 000 and x⇤ = 1, 700, 000 start the first derby in the 7th year
(t=6), so why do they have different values for threshold award prize p⇤ and to-
tal costs? The reason is that sustained lionfish biomasses are different after sev-
eral years are different. If the award prize is unchanged so that p⇤ = $7, 199.62
when x⇤ = 1, 700, 000, then it must happen that at some lionfish biomass levels
xt < x⇤ and constrained condition (5.10) a derby will not be held at that time.
The total cost function is different: x⇤ = 1, 700, 000 and p⇤ = $7, 199.62will result
in a periodical derby while x⇤ = 1, 600, 000 and p⇤ = $7, 199.62 will approach a
steady state.
C = G(x0, p6, p7, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 5], x⇤ = 1, 600, 000
C = G(x0, p6, ....., pi, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 5], some pi = 0, x⇤ = 1, 700, 000
Thus, when x⇤ = 1, 700, 000, invasive-species managers use the table method
and Excel Solver to relocate optimal threshold award prizes and find out
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whether they exist in a local steady state for x⇤ = 1, 700, 000. The steady state
comes to x⇤ = 1, 700, 000 and p⇤ = $4, 866.81,
xt+1 = xt = x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
Note that the sustained lionfish biomass level equals the threshold biomass
level and is greater than all previous levels. A similar situation applies to
x⇤ = 1, 800, 000.
The last row in Table 5.10 and Table 5.12 (f) shows the threshold combination
and evolution path for x⇤ = 1, 900, 000. The derby is held every other year and it
does not have a steady state. The total costs function can be rewritten as
C = G(x0, p7, p9, ....., p99), pt = 0 with t 2 [0, 6], pt = 0 when t is even, x⇤ = 1, 900, 000
After several years of holding the derby,
xt+1 , xt, xt+1 = xt 1 t >> 0
ht+1 , ht, ht+1 = ht 1
pt+1 , pt, pt+1 = pt 1 t >> 0
We then come back to Table 5.10. How can invasive-species managers make
decisions from this table? Combining this table with our previous analysis, we
can review the table in three parts. When designated threshold lionfish biomass
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x⇤ is less than the sustained lionfish biomass, the minimum total costs Cmin and
threshold award prize p⇤ are generally increasing and the sustained lioinfish
biomass is decreasing when x⇤ is increasing. Note that for some threshold
biomass x⇤, the p⇤ and Cmin don’t change because they start the first derby at
the same time and the total cost function is the same. In the steady state,
xt+1 = xt > x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
When the designated threshold of lionfish biomass x⇤ is greater than the pre-
viously calculated threshold for sustained biomass, then in each period the li-
oinfish biomass should always be at the x⇤ level, with total costs increasing. The
new sustained lionfish biomass level remains at x⇤ and threshold award prize
decreases in our simulations. In the steady state
xt+1 = xt = x⇤, t >> 0
ht+1 = ht
pt+1 = pt = p⇤, t >> 0
When the designated threshold of lionfish biomass x⇤ reaches a very high
value such that a periodical derby happens, this situation does not have a steady
state. The threshold award prize and total minimum costs are highest in our
simulation and the value for sustained biomass in a year with a derby approxi-
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mately the same as the value for sustained biomass when x⇤ value is small.
xt+1 , xt, xt+1 = xt 1 t >> 0
ht+1 , ht, ht+1 = ht 1
pt+1 , pt, pt+1 = pt 1 t >> 0
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Table 5.11: Evolution Excerpts for Different Lionfish Threshold Biomass
x⇤ 2 [10, 11, 12, 13]⇥105
(a) x⇤=1,000,000, p⇤= $7,141.35, Cmin= $2,436,762.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 7,141.35 205,199.33 1,370,813.25 40,507.84
6 7,141.35 231,290.53 1,545,112.83 48,739.71
7 7,141.35 242,961.14 1,623,077.19 52,084.70
8 7,141.35 246,886.02 1,649,296.96 52,528.03
9 7,141.35 248,026.06 1,656,912.86 51,919.46
10 7,141.35 248,340.23 1,659,011.62 51,015.61
11 7,141.35 248,425.46 1,659,581.01 50,045.70
12 7,141.35 248,448.49 1,659,734.82 49,072.46
13 7,141.35 248,454.70 1,659,776.32 48,112.39
14 7,141.35 248,456.37 1,659,787.51 47,169.57
15 7,141.35 248,456.82 1,659,790.53 46,244.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,141.35 248,456.99 1,659,791.65 8,762.93
(b) x⇤=1,100,000, p⇤= $7,141.35, Cmin= $2,436,762.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 7,141.35 205,199.33 1,370,813.25 40,507.84
6 7,141.35 231,290.53 1,545,112.83 48,739.71
7 7,141.35 242,961.14 1,623,077.19 52,084.70
8 7,141.35 246,886.02 1,649,296.96 52,528.03
9 7,141.35 248,026.06 1,656,912.86 51,919.46
10 7,141.35 248,340.23 1,659,011.62 51,015.61
11 7,141.35 248,425.46 1,659,581.01 50,045.70
12 7,141.35 248,448.49 1,659,734.82 49,072.46
13 7,141.35 248,454.70 1,659,776.32 48,112.39
14 7,141.35 248,456.37 1,659,787.51 47,169.57
15 7,141.35 248,456.82 1,659,790.53 46,244.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,141.35 248,456.99 1,659,791.65 8,762.93
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(c) x⇤=1,200,000, p⇤= $7,141.35, Cmin= $2,436,762.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 7,141.35 205,199.33 1,370,813.25 40,507.84
6 7,141.35 231,290.53 1,545,112.83 48,739.71
7 7,141.35 242,961.14 1,623,077.19 52,084.70
8 7,141.35 246,886.02 1,649,296.96 52,528.03
9 7,141.35 248,026.06 1,656,912.86 51,919.46
10 7,141.35 248,340.23 1,659,011.62 51,015.61
11 7,141.35 248,425.46 1,659,581.01 50,045.70
12 7,141.35 248,448.49 1,659,734.82 49,072.46
13 7,141.35 248,454.70 1,659,776.32 48,112.39
14 7,141.35 248,456.37 1,659,787.51 47,169.57
15 7,141.35 248,456.82 1,659,790.53 46,244.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,141.35 248,456.99 1,659,791.65 8,762.93
(d) x⇤=1,300,000, p⇤= $7,141.35, Cmin= $2,436,762.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 7,141.35 205,199.33 1,370,813.25 40,507.84
6 7,141.35 231,290.53 1,545,112.83 48,739.71
7 7,141.35 242,961.14 1,623,077.19 52,084.70
8 7,141.35 246,886.02 1,649,296.96 52,528.03
9 7,141.35 248,026.06 1,656,912.86 51,919.46
10 7,141.35 248,340.23 1,659,011.62 51,015.61
11 7,141.35 248,425.46 1,659,581.01 50,045.70
12 7,141.35 248,448.49 1,659,734.82 49,072.46
13 7,141.35 248,454.70 1,659,776.32 48,112.39
14 7,141.35 248,456.37 1,659,787.51 47,169.57
15 7,141.35 248,456.82 1,659,790.53 46,244.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,141.35 248,456.99 1,659,791.65 8,762.93
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Table 5.12: Evolution Excerpts for Different Lionfish Threshold Biomass
x⇤ 2 [6, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19]⇥105
(a) x⇤=600,000, p⇤= $7,050.54, Cmin= $2,429,717.49
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 7,050.54 139,047.49 932,800.21 22,590.67
5 7,050.54 183,612.67 1,231,765.76 33,870.23
6 7,050.54 218,307.84 1,464,518.33 44,351.34
7 7,050.54 237,201.80 1,591,268.49 50,225.44
8 7,050.54 244,502.22 1,640,243.38 51,942.15
9 7,050.54 246,758.57 1,655,380.06 51,758.50
10 7,050.54 247,392.28 1,659,631.37 50,974.85
11 7,050.54 247,564.86 1,660,789.12 50,037.18
12 7,050.54 247,611.45 1,661,101.66 49,072.43
13 7,050.54 247,624.00 1,661,185.83 48,114.55
14 7,050.54 247,627.38 1,661,208.48 47,172.27
15 7,050.54 247,628.28 1,661,214.58 46,247.63
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,050.54 247,628.62 1,661,216.82 8,763.47
(b) x⇤=1,000,000, p⇤= $7,141.35, Cmin= $2,436,762.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 7,141.35 205,199.33 1,370,813.25 40,507.84
6 7,141.35 231,290.53 1,545,112.83 48,739.71
7 7,141.35 242,961.14 1,623,077.19 52,084.70
8 7,141.35 246,886.02 1,649,296.96 52,528.03
9 7,141.35 248,026.06 1,656,912.86 51,919.46
10 7,141.35 248,340.23 1,659,011.62 51,015.61
11 7,141.35 248,425.46 1,659,581.01 50,045.70
12 7,141.35 248,448.49 1,659,734.82 49,072.46
13 7,141.35 248,454.70 1,659,776.32 48,112.39
14 7,141.35 248,456.37 1,659,787.51 47,169.57
15 7,141.35 248,456.82 1,659,790.53 46,244.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,141.35 248,456.99 1,659,791.65 8,762.93
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(c) x⇤=1,400,000, p⇤= $7,199.62, Cmin= $2,446,832.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330336.06 2097.69
3 0 0 573018.15 6188.23
4 0 0 932800.21 16077.06
5 0 0 1370813.25 34039.70
6 7199.62 262706.45 1750312.16 60800.71
7 7199.62 252138.15 1679899.64 55403.22
8 7199.62 249806.62 1664365.54 53430.10
9 7199.62 249204.08 1660351.03 52159.08
10 7199.62 249043.18 1659279.02 51077.97
11 7199.62 248999.85 1658990.36 50061.03
12 7199.62 248988.16 1658912.45 49075.37
13 7199.62 248985.00 1658891.42 48112.03
14 7199.62 248984.15 1658885.74 47168.37
15 7199.62 248983.92 1658884.20 46243.42
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 7,199.62 248,983.84 1,658,883.64 8,762.65
(d) x⇤=1,700,000, p⇤= $4,866.81, Cmin= $2,460,062.42
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 0 0 1,370,813.25 34,039.70
6 4,866.81 231,041.09 1,750,312.16 58,729.24
7 4,866.81 225,926.47 1,711,565.00 55,242.18
8 4,866.81 224,776.83 1,702,855.64 53,651.39
9 4,866.81 224,494.42 1,700,716.15 52,477.54
10 4,866.81 224,423.69 1,700,180.36 51,418.67
11 4,866.81 224,405.90 1,700,045.55 50,403.09
12 4,866.81 224,401.42 1,700,011.59 49,412.97
13 4,866.81 224,400.29 1,700,003.03 48,443.64
14 4,866.81 224,400.00 1,700,000.88 47,493.65
15 4,866.81 224,399.93 1,700,000.33 46,562.38
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 4,866.81 224,399.91 1,700,000.15 8,823.09
90
(e) x⇤=1,800,000, p⇤= $1,413.78, Cmin= $2,598,228.97
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 0 0 1,370,813.25 34,039.70
6 0 0 1,750,312.16 54,407.65
7 1,413.78 170,949.24 1,942,606.09 66,935.76
8 1,413.78 160,222.75 1,820,714.10 57,793.05
9 1,413.78 158,762.46 1,804,119.83 55,653.21
10 1,413.78 158,474.67 1,800,849.54 54,368.55
11 1,413.78 158,415.44 1,800,176.47 53,263.51
12 1,413.78 158,403.15 1,800,036.78 52,211.20
13 1,413.78 158,400.59 1,800,007.74 51,185.83
14 1,413.78 158,400.06 1,800,001.70 50,181.86
15 1,413.78 158,399.95 1,800,000.44 49,197.83
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 1,413.78 158,399.92 1,800,000.11 9,322.48
(f) x⇤=1,900,000, p⇤= $10,130.88, Cmin= $2,711,309.00
Time (t) Award
Prize (pt)
Harvest
Rate (ht)
Biomass
(xt)
Costs
(⇢tCt)
0 0 0 100,000.00 200.00
1 0 0 183,600.00 660.96
2 0 0 330,336.06 2,097.69
3 0 0 573,018.15 6,188.23
4 0 0 932,800.21 16,077.06
5 0 0 1,370,813.25 34,039.70
6 0 0 1,750,312.16 54,407.65
7 10,130.90 326,133.08 1,942,606.09 74,524.53
8 0 0 1,665,530.26 47,351.49
9 10,130.90 320,766.61 1,910,640.83 69,569.39
10 0 0 1,664,996.86 45,483.63
11 10,130.90 320,729.49 1,910,419.70 66,854.34
12 0 0 1,664,990.04 43,717.09
13 10,130.90 320,729.01 1,910,416.87 64,258.13
14 0 0 1,664,989.95 42,019.49
15 10,130.90 320,729.01 1,910,416.83 61,762.91
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ..
99 10,130.90 320,729.01 1,910,416.83 11,703.43
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5.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis Results
Influence of the Environmental Carrying Capacity
Table 5.13: Sensitivity Analysis of Carrying Capacity (K)
Carrying
Capacity
Change K
Threshold
Award
Prize p⇤
Total
Costs
Sustained
Lionfish
Biomass
Team
Number
N
Harvest
Rate h
1,200,000 $1,755.41 $983,748 1,032,658.49 12 97,559.63
1,400,000 $2,696.76 $1,299,574 1,204,768.23 13 131,031.95
1,600,000 $3,896.67 $1,648,988 1,376,877.98 15 168,966.49
1,800,000 $5,373.27 $2,028,981 1,521,088.92 17 207,410.44
2,000,000 $7,141.35 $2,436,762 1,659,791.65 18 248,456.94
2,200,000 $9,212.70 $2,869,737 1,793,166.70 20 291,807.99
2,400,000 $11,596.36 $3,325,489 1,921,387.94 22 337,186.46
2,600,000 $14,298.92 $3,801,771 2,044,623.18 23 384,335.37
2,800,000 $17,065.86 $4,282,165 2,166,172.61 24 431,507.85
a The Reference Case is K = 2, 000, 000.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
Table 5.13 shows how corresponding threshold award prize, total costs, sus-
tained lionfish biomass, team number and harvest rate change when carrying
capacity changes. Table 5.14 presents threshold award prize and total cost elas-
ticity results of environmental carrying capacity. All of the results are based on
the assumption that an invasive-species manager will keep the threshold lion-
fish biomass at x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
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Table 5.14: Sensitivity Analysis of Carrying Capacity (K) (cont’d)
Carrying
Capacity
Change K
Percentage
Change of
K
Elasticity
of p⇤
Elasticity
of Total
Costs
1,200,000 -40% +1.89 +1.49
1,400,000 -30% +2.07 +1.56
1,600,000 -20% +2.27 +1.62
1,800,000 -10% +2.48 +1.67
2,000,000 0% - -
2,200,000 10% +2.90 +1.78
2,400,000 20% +3.12 +1.82
2,600,000 30% +3.34 +1.87
2,800,000 40% +3.47 +1.89
a The Reference Case is K = 2, 000, 000.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
In Table 5.13, the first column shows different levels of carrying capacity.
Column two presents the corresponding threshold prize. Column three presents
the total costs. Column four is the final sustained lionfish biomass level with dif-
ferent carrying capacities and prizes. Column five is the calculated team num-
bers that participate in the derby. Column six is the sustained harvest rate when
lionfish biomass is sustained.
In Table 5.14, the first column is still different carrying capacity levels and
column two shows their percentage change compared with the reference case
of K = 2, 000, 000 g. The range of carrying capacity lies between  40% and
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+40% of the referred carrying capacity. Column three is the threshold award
prize elasticity and column four is the elasticity of total costs.
Changes in the environmental carrying capacities have different effects on
threshold prizes, total costs, and the final sustained lionfish biomass level. As
we see in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, the prize decreases when carrying capac-
ity decreases and it increases when carrying capacity increases. When carrying
capacity increases from 1.2 ⇥ 106 to 2.8 ⇥ 106, the threshold award prize is elas-
tic since its elasticity value is always greater than 1. The elasticity of threshold
award prize is increasing as carrying capacity is increasing, which means that
threshold award prize becomes more and more sensitive: it is 1.89 when car-
rying capacity is 1, 200, 000. This means that with a threshold biomass x⇤ of
1,000,000 g, a 1% increase in carrying capacity will increase the corresponding
designated prize by 1.89%. As the carrying capacity increases 40%, the prize
elasticity is then 3.47, which means a 1% increase in carrying capacity will lead
to a 3.47% increase in prize money.
Total cost increases when carrying capacity increases. The total cost is elas-
tic since its elasticity value is also greater than one as carrying capacity in-
creases. The elasticity of total cost increases when carrying capacity increases
and suggests that total costs become more sensitive to carrying capacity when
designated lionfish biomass is kept at approximately 1,000,000 g : 1.49 when
K = 1, 200, 000means that a 1% increase in carrying capacity will lead to a 1.49%
increase in total cost. Similarly, 1.89 when K = 2, 800, 000 means that a 1% in-
crease in carrying capacity and that total cost will increase 1.89%. Compared
with prize elasticity, total cost elasticity is lower. This suggests that total cost is
not as sensitive to carrying capacity as award prize is.
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Figure 5.9: Sensitivity Analysis of Carrying Capacity K (t=0-25)
We then turn back to Table 5.13, where the final sustained lionfish biomass
levels are all greater than the designated threshold lionfish biomass x⇤ =
1, 000, 000 g and the levels increase when carrying capacity increases. Based
on our team-number-prize equation (3.9) Nt = p t and   = 0.328, we can calcu-
late the expected number of participating teams number for different values of
sustained lionfish biomass. It shows that more teams will come to join the derby
when carrying capacity increases. For the harvest rate, we can calculate the sus-
tained harvest rate from Equation (3.10) where coefficient m = 0.00815. It shows
that the harvest rate is also increasing when carrying capacity K is increasing.
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Influence of the Discount Rate  
Table 5.15: Sensitivity Analysis of Discount Rate ( )
Discount
Rate  
Threshold
Award
Prize p⇤
Total Costs Sustained
Lionfish
Biomass
Team
Number
N
Harvest
Rate h
0.01 $7, 248.77 $3, 656, 370.76 1,658,121.57 18 249,425.44
0.02 $7, 141.35 $2, 436, 762.00 1,659,791.65 18 248,456.94
0.04 $6, 893.65 $1, 298, 809.87 1,663,708.09 18 246,176.25
0.06 $6, 634.96 $819, 853.25 1,667,900.69 18 243,719.79
0.08 $6, 384.48 $573, 419.16 1,672,066.27 18 241,263.82
0.1 $6, 147.26 $427, 426.33 1,676,113.71 17 238,862.89
a The Reference Case is   = 0.02.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
To determine the influence of the discount rate on threshold prize money,
total cost, and sustained lionfish biomass level, simulations are conducted with
various discount rates ranging from 1% to 10%.
In Table 5.16, the sign of award prize elasticity presents a reverse relationship
between award prize and the discount rate: when the discount rate decreases,
the award prize increases; when the discount rate increases, the prize decreases.
However, since all absolute value of elasticities remain at approximately 0.035,
which means a 1% increase or decrease in the discount rate, the corresponding
threshold prize will decrease or increase by 0.035%. The threshold award prize
is inelastic to discount rate and it is not sensitive to change of discount rate.
The minus sign of total costs elasticity shows that total cost decreases when
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Analysis of Discount Rate ( ) (cont’d)
Discount
Rate  
Percentage
Change of  
Elasticity
of p⇤
Elasticity of
Total Costs
0.01 -50% -0.0301 -1.001
0.02 0% - -
0.04 100% -0.0347 -0.467
0.06 200% -0.0355 -0.332
0.08 300% -0.0353 -0.255
0.1 400% -0.0348 -0.206
a The Reference Case is   = 0.02.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
the discount rate increases. To calculate the overall total cost, each period of
environmental cost needs to be discounted to its present value. The higher the
discount rate, the lower the present value will be. The absolute value of elas-
ticity decreases when the discount rate increases but it is lower than 1 except
when the discount rate is 0.01 and the elasticity is around 1. Thus it is inelastic
when discount rate is greater than 0.01. When the discount rate grows higher,
total cost elasticity is decreasing which means that it becomes less sensitive to
it.
Now turning back to Table 5.15, the discount rate plays an important role
in calculating total cost but not in the lionfish population dynamics system;
thus the sustained lionfish biomass grows slightly between 1.66 to 1.67 million
grams. Figure 5.10 shows a different trajectory of lionfish biomass with derbies.
Similarly, based on Equation (3.9) and (3.10), team numbers are keeping around
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Figure 5.10: Sensitivity Analysis of Discount Rate (t=0-25)
18 and harvest rates are slightly decreasing from 2.5⇥105gto2.4 ⇥ 105g.
Influence of the Environmental Damage Coefficient d
Since the environmental damage coefficient is calculated from several assump-
tions, it is important to consider its impact on prize money and total cost. It
can be expected that an increase in the damage coefficient will have a positive
influence on total cost. Simulations are conducted with the damage coefficient
ranging from 1 ⇥ 10 8 to 1 ⇥ 10 7.
The results show that prize money increases when damage coefficient in-
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Analysis of Damage Coefficient (d)
Damage
Coefficient
d
Threshold
Award
Prize p⇤
Total Costs Sustained
Lionfish
Biomass
Team
Number
N
Harvest
Rate h
0.00000001 $1,041.40 $684,677.68 1,819,081.63 10 144,806.44
0.00000002 $2,758.64 $1,303,984.50 1,750,969.25 13 191,859.88
0.00000004 $7,141.35 $2,436,762.00 1,659,791.38 18 248,456.90
0.00000006 $12,281.80 $3,472,730.45 1,593,572.68 22 284,975.44
0.00000008 $17,902.52 $4,437,273.87 1,540,102.75 25 311,647.17
0.0000001 $23,855.83 $5,344,614.80 1,494,692.25 27 332,323.02
a The Reference Case is d = 0.00000004.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
Table 5.18: Sensitivity Analysis of Damage Coefficient (d) (cont’d)
Damage Co-
efficient d
Percentage
Change of  
Elasticity
of p⇤
Elasticity of
Total Costs
0.00000001 -75% +1.14 +0.96
0.00000002 -50% +1.23 +0.93
0.00000004 0% - -
0.00000006 50% +1.44 +0.85
0.00000008 100% +1.51 +0.82
0.0000001 150% +1.56 +0.80
a The Reference Case is d = 0.00000004.
b Threshold Lionfish Biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g.
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creases. All absolute value of elasticities are greater than 1. This means thresh-
old award prize is elastic that a 1% increase in the damage coefficient will result
in more than a 1% increase in the prize. The increasing award prize elasticity in-
dicates that prizes become more and more sensitive to damage coefficient when
d increases.
The total costs increases with an increasing damage coefficient. The first fea-
ture is that total cost elasticities are all positive but less than 1 which means that
total cost elasticity is inelastic that a 1% increase in damage coefficient will lead
to less than a 1% increase in total cost. The second feature is that elasticities de-
crease as total cost becomes less sensitive to increasing damage coefficient. The
third feature is that the elasticity of threshold award prize is always greater than
total cost elasticity which means that award prize is more sensitive to damage
change than total cost.
The sustained lionfish biomass level has a reverse relationship with the dam-
age coefficient: When the environmental damage coefficient is 1 ⇥ 10 8, the sus-
tained lionfish biomass level reaches its highest level; when the damage coef-
ficient is 1 ⇥ 10 7, the sustained lionfish biomass level reaches its lowest level.
However, all sustained lionfish biomass levels are greater than invasive-species
manager-designed thresholds for lionfish biomass x⇤ = 1, 000, 000 g. Based on
Equation (3.9) and (3.10), team number and harvest rate are always increasing
as damage coefficient is increasing.
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Figure 5.11: Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental Damage Coefficient d
(t=0-25)
Discussion
From our simulation results, changes in carrying capacity, discount rate and
damage coefficient all have different impacts on threshold award prize, total
costs, sustained lionfish biomass, team number and harvest rate.
Increases in carrying capacity all have positive impacts on other variables:
the award prize is increasing; more teams will participate in the derby, which
means that the fishing effort is increasing; the harvest rate is increasing so that
more lionfish can be removed. However, the sustained lionfish biomass also
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grows and minimum total costs grows higher due to higher carrying capacity.
Compared with carrying capacity, increases in the discount rate don’t have
much impact on those variables. Although total costs decrease as the dis-
count rate increases, all other variables-threshold award prize, sustained lion-
fish biomass, team number, and harvest rate-are slightly increasing or decreas-
ing but almost remain at a certain level. The discount rate is important in cal-
culating the present value of total costs, but it doesn’t involve much in terms of
the population dynamics system.
Increases in damage coefficient help decrease the sustained lionfish biomass
and threshold award prize, team number, and harvest rate are all increasing.
However, total costs are increasing as well.
Simulation results help Invasive-species manager understand how some pa-
rameters affect different variables. They can make better decisions in the future
when choosing or calculating those parameters.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this paper is to construct a bioeconomic model that
combines lionfish population dynamics with derby harvests in order to assess
derby-controlling effects on an invasive species and how to determine optimal
derby prize money, total costs, and sustained lionfish biomass.
Previous research on the lionfish derby in Key Largo, Florida, has tried to
evaluate derby effects. Dr. Green’s prey–predation model is based on the as-
sumption that invasive lionfish will consume native species for food; therefore,
lionfish biomass can be estimated by the reduced number of native prey. Dr.
Green also tried to simulate volunteers’ catch-per-unit effort based on derby in-
formation. Research conducted by Cruz, Chaves, and Cote suggests that man-
agement of an invasive species can be facilitated by public participation and its
success was best predicted by national wealth (GDP per capita) and the number
of local dive shops.
It is difficult to find research on lionfish that incorporates an ecological
model with economic factors. My model simplifies lionfish population dynam-
ics and participants’ fishing efforts (how human behavior can affect lionfish
biomass). Lionfish population dynamics follows a logistic net growth function,
and lionfish harvest function adopts a simple catch-per-unit effort production
function that simplifies participants by considering them as members of count-
able teams.
There are three main questions I seek to answer are these:
(1) Does a derby-designated lionfish threshold [x⇤, p⇤] have control effects
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on lionfish biomass?
(2) How can invasive-species manager make decisions in choosing appropri-
ately designated values for lionfish biomass x⇤ and award prize p⇤?
(3) How are optimal prize money, total costs, and sustained lionfish biomass
levels affected by a change in each bioeconomic parameter?
Based on the simulated results, a derby surely does have an effect on con-
trolling local lionfish to a certain level. In a year when there is no derby held,
the total cost of control is highest and reaches $3.1 million. A derby year with
a random threshold combination has a lower cost than the off-year. In order to
evaluate each threshold’s combination of controlling effects, we look at corre-
sponding total costs and sustained lionfish biomass. Although total costs and
sustained lionfish biomass have a slight change when the designated threshold
x⇤ increases, still, the sustained level is always around 1.66 million grams. This
is the case when the threshold lionfish biomass x⇤ is lower than the sustained
lionfish biomass. When x⇤ is greater than this sustained derby level, the derby
will help to reduce lionfish to this x⇤ level, or a periodic derby can help keep
the fish at this sustained level. However, the minimum total cost is also increas-
ing. In this way, designated thresholds help control lionfish biomass but are of
limited use when lionfish biomass reaches a certain level.
Changing environmental conditions of marine ecosystems are likely to have
a profound impact on the population dynamics of lionfish. Our simulations
show that the extent of change in prize money and total costs are greater for
the change in carrying capacity. Smaller carrying capacity generally leads to
decreased prize money and total costs, while increased carrying capacity has
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a much more positive impact on prize money and total costs (which are more
sensitive to carrying capacity changes). Although the designated threshold of li-
onfish biomass remains at 1,000,000 g, the sustained lionfish biomass was never
controlled below this level and it increases when carrying capacity increases.
Team number and harvest rate is also increasing. Turning to evaluate discount
rate impacts, these do not have much influence on prize money, sustained li-
onfish biomass, team number, and harvest rate, but the calculated total cost
is decreasing: the great increases in discount rates lead to small decreases in
prizes and other variables, except total cost. Also, the final, sustained lionfish
biomass is still approximately 1.66 million grams. The increasing damage coeffi-
cient surely leads to decreasing sustained lionfish biomass. The optimal award
prize, total costs, team number and harvest rate all present a certain positive
proportional change.
This paper also points out the importance of accurate and sufficient
data.When calibrating related parameters, such as the congestion parameter in
the participant prize relation function or harvest function coefficient m, infor-
mation from the derbies was not sufficient to do persuasive econometric analy-
sis. The award prize used in our simulation remains at $3,550, except it is $3,625
in 2013. If prize money is ranging from $2,000 to $20,000, it is helpful to bet-
ter estimate the congestion parameter  , thus determining the response of the
number of four-person teams to award prize money. Although those values are
discounted to their real price taking 2010 as the base year, there is not enough
variation in prize money to see a more accurate relation between team number
and award prize. The environmental costs damage coefficient is based on an
assumption that environmental costs from lionfish is $0.02/ha which is a much
lower estimate than its real costs. Other methods, such as the travel cost model
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or contingent valuation methods, also need abundant information from derby
participants. Continuing to record data and monitor the effects of derbies is
required for future research work.
For derby organizers, It is suggested from harvest function h = qEtxt =
q(aNt)xt = qap
 
t xt = mp
 
t xt that harvest function coefficient m and congestion
parameter   help determine a more efficient derby in which derby organizers
have direct control of these parameters. Other parameters, such as carrying ca-
pacity or lionfish damage coefficient are measured objectively and we have less
impact on them. Besides calibrating them more accurately, derby organizers
should think about how to improvem and   to help increase derby performance.
The award prize discussed in our model suggests a higher award prize attracts
more participants to join in the derby. However, for each team, a higher award
prize will drive their interest to catch as many lionfish as they can. This is not
only true for winners, it also increases harvest biomass for non-prize-winners.
It is hoped that the model constructed in this paper will be used as a refer-
ence tool by REEF for future lionfish control management—either in monitor-
ing lionfish, recording data, analyzing derbies, or making plans. It is also hoped
that other invasive species managers, related institutions and governments, can
take cues in constructing other incentive programs against invasive species.
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APPENDIX A
INVASIVE SPECIES IN KEY LARGO, FLORIDA
Group Family Scientific
Name
Common
Name
Native or
Exotic
Fresh,
Marine or
Brackish
Amphibians-
Frogs
Bufonidae Rhinella
marina
Cane Toad Native Freshwater
Amphibians-
Frogs
Eleuthero-
dactylidae
Eleuthero-
dactylus
planirostris
Greenhouse
Frog
Exotic Freshwater
Amphibians-
Frogs
Hylidae Osteopilus
septentrion-
alis
Cuban
Treefrog
Exotic Group
Crustaceans-
Copepods
Cyclopidae Bryocyclops
muscicola
a copepod Exotic Freshwater
Crustaceans-
Copepods
Cyclopidae Mesocyclops
ogunnus
a copepod Exotic Freshwater
Crustaceans-
Copepods
Cyclopidae Paracyclops
bromelia-
cola
a copepod Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Characidae Colossoma
Piaractus
sp.
unidentified
pacu
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Characidae Piaractus
brachypo-
mus
pirapatinga red-bellied
pacu
Exotic
Fishes Cichlidae Cichlasoma
urophthal-
mus
Mayan
Cichlid
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Cichlidae Hemichromis
letourneuxi
African
Jewelfish
Exotic Freshwater-
Brackish
Fishes Cichlidae Herichthys
cyanogutta-
tus
Rio Grande
Cichlid
Native Freshwater
Fishes Cichlidae Oreochromis
sp.
Tilapia
species
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Cichlidae Thorichthys
meeki
Firemouth
Cichlid
Exotic Freshwater
Table A.1: Invasive Species in Key Largo, Florida
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Fishes Cichlidae Sarotherodon
melanoth-
eron
Blackchin
Tilapia
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Clariidae Clarias
batrachus
Walking
Catfish
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Grammatidae Gramma
loreto
Fairy
Basslet
Exotic Marine
Fishes Osteog-
lossidae
Osteog-
lossum
bicirrhosum
Silver
Arowana
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Poeciliidae Belonesox
belizanus
Pike
Killifish
Exotic Freshwater
Fishes Scorpaenidae Pterois voli-
tans/miles
lionfish Exotic Marine
Mollusks-
Gastropods
Muricidae Rapana
venosa
veined
rapa whelk
Exotic Marine
Plants Amaran-
thaceae
Alternan-
thera
philoxe-
roides
alligator-
weed
Exotic Freshwater
Plants Pteridaceae Ceratopteris
thalictroides
watersprite Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Chelydridae Chelydra
serpentina
Snapping
Turtle
Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Emydidae Deirochelys
reticularia
chrysea
Florida
Chicken
Turtle
Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Emydidae Pseudemys
nelsoni
Florida
Red-bellied
Cooter
Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Emydidae Trachemys
callirostris
callirostris
Columbian
slider
Exotic Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Emydidae Trachemys
scripta
Pond Slider Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Emydidae Trachemys
scripta
elegans
Red-eared
Slider
Native Freshwater
Reptiles-
Turtles
Trionychidae Apalone
ferox
Florida
Softshell
Native Freshwater
Table A.2: Invasive Species in Key Largo, Florida (cont,d)
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